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
THE ETHICAL ASPECT
OF
LOTZE'S METAPHYSICS

BY

VIDA F. MOORE, M.S., PH.D.

Formerly Fellow of Cornell University.

New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
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CHAPTER I.

LOTZE'S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES AND PRE-SUPPOSITIONS.

IN closing his earliest philosophical work, the *Metaphysik* of 1841, Lotze gave expression to the conviction that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. After nearly forty years of philosophical activity, he re-affirmed this conviction in the closing words of the *Metaphysik* of 1879, the latest of his works published during his lifetime. The expression, he admits, is not exact, but he still feels certain of being in the right in seeking the ground of that which *should* be in that which *is*.¹ He further expresses the hope that what may seem unacceptable in this view may be justified in a future work. Unfortunately, his death, in July, 1881, prevented the appearance of the third and last division of his *System der Philosophie*, which was to have treated of the philosophy of religion, morals, and æsthetics. The little volumes of outlines from his lecture-notes in part make good this loss, yet Lotze's system must remain incomplete, and that too in what is, in a certain sense, the keystone of the structure. It is the writer's aim in what follows to show not merely that Lotze's system is pervaded by his ethical views, and by æsthetic ideals scarcely to be distinguished from ethical, but rather to show that his most characteristic metaphysical doctrines grow out of ethical conceptions, that these conceptions are an essential factor in his metaphysics, that without them his speculative theory of the universe lacks both completeness and coherence.

Perhaps we can find no better way of approach to our subject than to consider in brief what were the motives which impelled Lotze to the study of philosophy, what were the conditions of the time which gave direction to his thought, and what the ideals which inspired it. Philosophy is always a piece of life, as Lotze himself has said,² and thought can not be divorced from the per-

¹ *Met.*, *Schluss*, p. 604.

² *Kl. Schr.*, 3, p. 455.

...sonality of the thinker. We shall find this inquiry the more fruitful for the reason that we are not left to conjecture on these points, or limited to the bare facts of Lotze's life, but have access to a somewhat full and frank confession from his own pen.¹

Born² May 21, 1817, in Bautzen, Saxony, Lotze was a compatriot of Lessing and the elder Fichte, a fact in which he felt much pleasure. He was the son of a physician, and determined in early youth to follow his father's profession. While very young he was brought by his parents to Zittau, and it was here that he received his early education. The gymnasium at Zittau was an old institution and under able direction. Its corps of teachers included men distinguished for scholarship, and the comparatively small number of pupils was favorable for careful instruction. It is remarked by Rehnisch that the fact that Lotze translated the *Antigone* of Sophocles into Latin, in an elegant and masterly manner and for the purpose of recreation, twenty years after leaving this school, comments favorably upon the thoroughness of the instruction he received there.³ In the register of the gymnasium at Zittau it is recorded of Lotze that "he studied philosophy and the physical sciences."⁴

In his reply to I. H. Fichte, Lotze says that it was a strong inclination to poetry⁵ and art which first led him to study philosophy; and unto the end of his life the spectacle of the world was for him 'everywhere wonders and poetry.'⁶ It was a happy fortune indeed by which the poetic temperament was combined in Lotze with a taste and aptitude for the sciences. Keenly sensitive to the beauty of the world and to the moral import of life, his acute and analytic mind must needs explain and systematize

¹ Philosophy in the last Forty Years, *Contemp. Rev.*, Jan., 1880. Reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 3.

² I have made use of an admirable brief sketch of Lotze's life written by E. Rehnisch, a colleague of Lotze's at Göttingen: "Hermann Lotze, sa vie et ses écrits," *Revue Philosophique*, 1881.

³ *Rev. Ph.*, 1881, p. 322.

⁴ *Rev. Ph.*, 1881, p. 322.

⁵ It may not be known to all the readers of Lotze that among his earliest works was a little volume of poems, published in 1840. See Wm. Wallace: *Lectures and Essays*, p. 488. Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 50-55.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 623.

tize. Speculative and practical demands were alike urgent upon him ; experience must be sifted, explained, and unified, in order to the justification and satisfaction of the ideals of the speculative no less than those of the practical reason. This keen speculative interest gave Lotze his bent towards scientific study and made of him a philosopher in place of a poet.

Lotze entered the University at Leipzig at the age of seventeen, with the purpose of studying medicine. In the courses preparatory to his medical studies he had for his teachers E. H. Weber, Volkmann, and Fechner, while at the same time he came under the influence of Weisse, whose views on the subject of æsthetics, especially, had a lasting effect upon him. To his scientific training are due in large part, no doubt, that scrupulous caution, that painstaking care for details, and that reverence for facts which are so conspicuous in all Lotze's work. To quote from Rehnisch, "he will always be named among the masters who have made philosophy take 'the sure march of a science.'"¹ In later life, to be sure, Lotze's interest in science seemed somewhat to wane ; for when Darwin's theory was attracting the attention of all thinking men, it met with seeming indifference from him. That a man of scientific training should be so little impressed by a hypothesis of so great import for natural science is somewhat surprising. It may be, as von Hartmann suggests, that in his later years Lotze was prevented by weariness from busying himself with questions which for his personal assurance were finally settled.²

In March, 1838, Lotze obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy, and in July of the same year that of doctor of medicine. He returned to Leipzig as a member of the Faculty of Medicine in 1839, and a few months later became a member of the Faculty of Philosophy. He was made professor extraordinary at Leipzig in 1843, and in 1844 was called to Göttingen to fill the chair vacant since the death of Herbart. Though frequently called to other universities, Lotze remained at Göttingen until the spring of 1881, when he finally accepted a call to Berlin. He had but entered upon his work there when his death occurred

¹ *Rev. Ph.*, 1881, p. 336.

² *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 42.

in July of that year. His life was uneventful in incident, and his efforts were always in some measure restricted by ill health.

Pfleiderer divides Lotze's literary career into three periods.¹ These may be designated for convenience as the period of his scientific and early philosophical activity, the period of the *Mikrokosmos*, and of the *System der Philosophie*. During the first period (1840-1852) Lotze's activity was chiefly scientific, yet the early *Logik* (1841) and the early *Metaphysik* (1843) fall within this period, testifying to his interest in philosophical speculation, and anticipating not only the general direction which his later thought was to take, but many of the conclusions at which he later arrived. These earlier works seem to have made little impression upon his contemporaries, since his position as a thinker was very generally misunderstood. Moreover, the scientific works of this period are pervaded by a philosophical spirit, as is suggested by the titles even. Lotze's first work, *De futurae biologiae principibus philosophicis*, was a treatise presented for the degree of doctor of medicine. There followed a series of publications animated by one purpose, that of establishing the laws of mechanism as the principle of the scientific explanation of vital phenomena. The *Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als Mechanische Naturwissenschaften* appeared in 1842; *Lebenskraft*, in 1843; *Seele und Seelenleben* in 1846; *Allgemeine Physiologie des Körperlichen Lebens* in 1851; and the *Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele* in 1852.

It is noteworthy that the early period of Lotze's activity coincides in general with the transition to the new scientific era.² The day of practical modern invention had dawned, the era of steam, of electricity, of the arrogance of power vested in material things. The Idealism of Fichte and of Hegel seemed but a vision of the night-time which fades in the light of day. Materialistic theories were wide-spread and triumphant. Men turned from metaphysical speculation with distrust and hailed science as the god of the new day. But science was just emerging from an obscure past, and was as yet uncertain of its province and its methods,

¹ Lotze's *philosophische Weltanschauung*, pp. 7-9.

² See Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 8-10.

and was not a little hampered by tradition and prejudice. As a physician, Lotze first directed his efforts towards correcting and clarifying the physiological and medical science of his day. Physiology was at this time much dominated by Schelling's philosophy of nature. Schelling had sought to mediate between the mechanical explanation of nature and the old theory of a 'vital force,' but had virtually re-instated the latter as the necessary explanation of phenomena in the organic world. Furthermore, the relation of mind and body—a long- vexed problem for philosophy—had assumed a new urgency for medical science, which, in common with the other sciences of the day, was struggling after clearer conceptions of the facts and principles within its scope. Moreover, a new mental science, having little in common with the old psychology save the name, was just beginning to differentiate itself from the physical sciences, and rendered imperative an investigation of the relation between mental and cortical processes. In his scientific writings of this period Lotze aimed to prove once and for all the untenability of the 'vital force' theory as an explanation of the phenomena of living bodies. The body is a mechanism, he held; for the purposes of science its functions are wholly explicable by the mechanism of natural laws. Science need seek no ulterior explanation. The *Medicinische Psychologie*, a pioneer work of the new psychology, extends the principle of mechanism to explain the interaction of mind and body. For this Lotze coined the term 'physico-psychical' mechanism, but later gratefully accepted the less awkward phrase, 'psycho-physical,' an amendment suggested by Fechner.

Appearing at a time when materialism was in the ascendancy, it is not perhaps altogether surprising that the purport of Lotze's scientific writings was misunderstood. He was warmly welcomed by the materialists as a champion of that theory, while, by many he was classed as a follower of Herbart. In his reply to I. H. Fichte,¹ Lotze denied both these assertions, referring to his published writings as affording ample refutation. Leaving the early philosophical works out of the question, the *Medicinische Psychologie* alone contains frequent and explicit state-

¹ *Streit-Schriften*, 1857.

ments as to the falsity and inadequacy of materialism as a metaphysical theory. Materialism is due to an apotheosis of natural science, Lotze declared ;¹ in its desire for simplicity it seeks a false unity by ignoring the disparateness of physical and mental phenomena. In truth the last result of scientific analysis but serves to emphasize the sharp division between the two realms.² Indications are not lacking, even in these earlier writings, that Lotze looked upon the mechanical explanation of natural processes as by no means final. For science, indeed, the explanation is final ; for the metaphysician it remains to explain the nature, origin, and meaning of mechanism itself.

The second period³ of Lotze's life is that marked by the appearance of the *Mikrokosmos*, in three volumes (1856, 1858, 1864). In this work Lotze sought to unite the two sides of one and the same *Weltanschauung*, to show "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the world."⁴ It is now that Lotze definitely undertakes his life's labor as the vindicator of the ideal interpretation of life and nature against the materialistic drift of current thought. The task which he imposed upon himself was something more than a reconciliation of faith and knowledge⁵: He sought both to vindicate the reality of the spiritual needs of men, which find expression in religious beliefs and in moral and æsthetic ideals, and to determine their significance for metaphysics. Rehnisch remarks that one can easily guess that the idea of such a work as the *Mikrokosmos* dates back to Lotze's student days at Leipzig, when the æsthetic of Weisse, the physiology of Weber, and the physics of Fechner were taking deep root in his mind. The convictions of the *Mikrokosmos* were born of conflicts waged in earlier days.⁶

It is interesting to notice to how great an extent Lotze's work

¹ *Med. Psy.*, I, 1, § 3, p. 35.

² *Med. Psy.*, I, 1, § 5, pp. 55, 65.

³ To this period belongs also the *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland*, 1868.

⁴ *Mikr.*, XV.

⁵ Cf. von Hartmann : *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 45.

⁶ *Rév. Ph.*, 1881, p. 331.

was that of mediation between widely opposed theories. For such a service he had unusual qualifications both by nature and by training. Not only did he seek to show that there is no conflict between the scientific and the philosophical views of the world, but within the field of metaphysics his office was that of reconciliation. When Lotze entered upon his philosophical career he found two rival theories, bitterly antagonistic, contesting the field. Empiricism, to be sure, had for the time being the better of the conflict; it had the greater following and received the popular plaudits. But Idealism was not dead; on the contrary, it showed at times a latent energy that disconcerted its foes. Lotze was both an empiricist and an idealist: an empiricist in his reverence for facts and his insistence that experience must be the starting-point of speculation, an idealist in his interpretation of the empirical order. Thus he was quick to see both the strength and the weaknesses of either metaphysical theory. Throughout his work we find this union of empiricism and idealism, sometimes to the clarifying of thought and sometimes to its confusion.

The third and last period is that in which Lotze purposed to present his system of philosophy in completed form, the comprehensive view of God, nature, and man, which was the fruit of the thought and labor of a life-time. The first two parts only of the projected work were completed—the *Logik* appearing in 1874, and the *Metaphysik* in 1879. The third part—the practical philosophy—was left unfinished at the death of the author.

In the article to which reference has been made above,¹ Lotze states the philosophical ideals, or 'prejudices,' as he frankly terms them, with which he entered upon his work. "When I began my philosophical studies the predominant opinion was still that to which Fichte has given the distinctest expression, that no theory of the world should pass for truth and science which was unable to explain all the particular parts of the world's history as independent consequences of a single general principle."²

¹ *Philosophy in the last Forty Years.*

² *Kl. Schr.*, 3, p. 451.

Bred in the traditions of the Hegelian school, Lotze goes on to say, he never ceased to keep hold of the element of truth which Fichte's assertion seemed to him to contain. At the same time, this assertion seemed to Lotze to efface an important distinction, namely, that between the all-comprehensive system of the universe and our human insight into this system. As to the universe itself, he felt no hesitation in presupposing this unity; but the task of deducing the manifold out of a single fundamental principle, he believed to be too great for the finite intelligence. Only a spirit standing in the center of the universe which he himself had made "could, with the knowledge of the final aim which he had given to his creation, make all the parts of it pass before him in the majestic succession of an unbroken development."¹ We finite beings at the circumference of the circle can hope to acquire only an approximate knowledge of the system; it must be by a *regressive* investigation that philosophy may seek to discover what is the living principle in the construction and course of the world.² The universe is indeed one, Lotze would seem to say, the self-realization of one ultimate and immanent principle; but the finite mind may well prove incapable of deducing the many from the One, of showing the logical relation of the parts to the whole and the necessary development therefrom.

The unity of things, in the sense thus guarded, is then one of the 'prejudices' with which Lotze set out upon the philosophical current of his youth. The other finds expression in the conviction that "intellectual life is more than thought."³ Here again Lotze attacks the Hegelian dialectic. Philosophy has erred in over-rating thought; knowledge is "not the sole portal through which that which constitutes the essence of real existence can enter into connection with the mind. . . . Much goes on within us which even our thinking intelligence follows and contemplates only from without, and whose peculiar contents it cannot exhaustively represent either in the form of an idea, or though a union of ideas."⁴ Even he who is boldly confident that nothing is impenetrable to the mind, cannot be equally con-

¹ *Kl. Schr.*, 3, p. 452.³ *Kl. Schr.*, 3, p. 453.² Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 611-612.⁴ *Ibid.*

fidant in assuming that "thought is the precise organ which will be able to comprehend the real in its innermost essence."¹ On the contrary, Lotze believes, the mind would always find that the objects with which it occupies itself, and especially the highest principle of all, contain matter over and above that which is capable of being apprehended in the form of thought, even if the mind was quite perfect as an instrument of intellectual apprehension. Not only so, but the unity of all reality may be organized on a plan not demonstrable by logical laws, it may be impossible to arrange its members in logical order. For instance, the unity of a melody is not less real and organic to the musical composition because it does not lend itself to logical proof and arrangement. "The world is certainly not so constituted," Lotze maintains, "that the individual, fundamental truths which we find dominating in it hang together according to the poor pattern of a logical superordination, coördination, and subordination."² There will be occasion later to discuss Lotze's objections to Hegelianism, and the merit of his contention. The revolt against what he deemed an overweening intellectualism is one of the characteristic notes in Lotze's writings.

These two ideas, then—the unity of all reality and that life is more than thought—are the convictions with which Lotze began the study of philosophy. In stating them he affirms his belief that "except in rare cases, a prolonged philosophical labor is nothing else but the attempt to justify scientifically a fundamental view of things which has been adopted in early life."³

The question now arises, In what degree are these ideas ethical in content? But this question suggests another: In how far does Lotze distinguish ethical from æsthetic ideas? On this point, as on many others, the student of Lotze's system is baffled by an absence of careful definition, and accurate and consistent use of terms. This defect is especially noticeable in the field of the practical philosophy, where it is at the same time

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Kl. Schr.*, 3, p. 479. Cf. also pp. 472, 474.

³ *Kl. Schr.*, 3: p. 455.

more mischievous, since such terms as the Good, the Beautiful, Value, and the like, belonging as they do to the vocabulary of everyday life, are more vague in their meaning than are the technical terms of metaphysics and logic. Lotze nowhere carefully distinguishes the ethical from the æsthetic; he nowhere concisely defines what he means by the good or the beautiful. He not infrequently uses the term 'æsthetic' in a sense but little removed from its primary meaning, that is, as pertaining to the sensibilities and thus including both the ethical and the æsthetic feelings. It is evidently in this sense that Lotze uses the word when he says that the metaphysical reasons for believing in the unity of Being have been reinforced by 'æsthetic inclinations' which have yielded a prejudice as to the nature of this Being.¹ Again he speaks of the connection of the elements of the world in an 'æsthetic unity' of purpose or meaning.² It is in this sense too, I think, that we must interpret the 'æsthetic' faith in the validity of logical principles, which he posits.³ The interpretation of the term as including ethical as well as æsthetic sentiment is less obviously necessary, perhaps, in the last two cases cited than in the first; yet 'æsthetic' in the ordinary sense of the term is quite evidently inadequate to express Lotze's meaning here.⁴

The beautiful and the good Lotze classes together as ideas of worth or value: "We can conceive of the 'beautiful' and the 'happy' or 'blessedness' as united with the Good into one complex of all that has value."⁵ It will be necessary later to ascertain as nearly as possible what Lotze means by the good and by value. For our present purpose it suffices to say that the good subjectively is the 'blessedness' of sensitive beings; objectively it is some end to be realized.⁶ The beautiful as well as the good has a subjective significance in the happiness its contemplation gives, and an objective significance in adaptation

¹ *Met.*, § 84.

² *Met.*, § 195.

³ *Logik*, § 364.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 272-273; *Phil. of Relig.*, § 4; *Pract. Phil.*, § 7.

⁵ *Outl. of Met.*, § 92.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 614-717; *Outl. of Met.*, § 92; *Phil. of Relig.*, §§ 66, 67.

to an end.¹ In our attempts to analyze experience, we arrive at three irreducible elements—universal laws or necessarily valid truths, immediately given facts of reality, and determinations of worth.² Our universe cleaves apparently into these three realms of Truth, Reality, and Worth. It is Lotze's belief that the Infinite Reality "unfolds itself in one movement which for finite cognition appears in the three aspects of the good which is its end, the constructive impulse by which this is realized, and the conformity to law with which this impulse keeps in the path that leads towards its end."³ Beauty is defined by Lotze rather vaguely as an appearance to immediate intuition of a unity of these three factors or realms which cognition is unable completely to unite.⁴ Only in the totality of the world can we presuppose a perfect congruity of the three; but wherever in a single phenomenon the parts act harmoniously towards the realization of an end, in accordance with laws not imposed upon them from without but immanent in them as a spontaneous and joyous activity, that object we term *beautiful*. It is beautiful because 'it repeats in a picture that we can intuit' the general idea of Beauty—the 'perfect, reciprocal involution' of the realms of Truth, Reality, and Worth.⁵

It is evident that no sharp distinction can be made between the good and the beautiful on the basis of the principles here laid down. Both denote that which has worth, on the subjective side for the sensitive beings within the range of whose experience they come, on the objective side in an end which conforms to the world-aim. The good is a higher category than the beautiful, we are told;⁶ it is not in and of itself also beautiful, but first becomes beautiful in the course of its actualization. In the final result of synthesis the Good is the supreme principle, the highest and sole Reality.⁷ The beautiful is good in that and

¹ *Outl. of Æsthetics*, §§ 6, 7, 16.

² *Mikr.*, 3: p. 461; Cf. *Outl. of Æs.*, § 8.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 616.

⁴ *Outl. of Æs.*, §§ 9, 14.

⁵ *Outl. of Æs.*, §§ 10, 14, 23.

⁶ *Outl. of Æs.*, § 11.

⁷ *Mikr.*, 3: 615, 623.

so far as it is beautiful, for in just this measure it epitomizes in concrete form the complete and perfect Idea of the Good which is also the Idea of Beauty.

To return to the question previously raised: In how far are the two pre-suppositions which Lotze, by his own confession, brought to the study of philosophy, ethical in their content? There is abundant proof that Lotze's unitary conception of the world was at least influenced in large measure by ethical considerations. The citations from the *Metaphysik* and the *Logik* indicate how constantly the ethical problem is present to his thought. Ethical considerations are for him bound up with those that are religious and æsthetic as well. Lotze is wont to group all these together as pertaining to spiritual needs, to the demands of the heart as over against those of the speculative reason.¹ In the *Metaphysik* Lotze expressly asserts that his doctrine of the unity of the world-ground rests upon a purely speculative basis, while at the same time he confesses himself not to be indifferent to the religious interests involved in such a conception.² But while the strictly metaphysical aspect of the problem may admit of proof, or of a rational apprehension which approximates to proof, the essential unity of the three realms of truth, reality, and worth under the concept of the Good is an ideal of the practical reason which the speculative reason is unable completely to vindicate or to explain.³ It is 'reason appreciative of worth' that affirms the unity of the Supreme Principle which realizes itself in all that is. That the universe should be *one*, one in purpose and in harmony, is an ethical no less than an æsthetic or religious demand.

It is a principle of Lotze's epistemology, constantly reiterated, that the truth which is necessary for thought is valid for the reality to which thought applies it.⁴ The ethical instinct in Lotze makes it an incredible notion to him "that the universe should be split in two in such a way that the whole intel-

¹ See *Introd.* to *Mikr.*; *Introd.* to *Ph. of Relig.*, § 4.

² *Met.*, § 233.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 461, 617 seq.; *Outl. of Æs.*, § 9.

⁴ *Logik*, §§ 303-312; *Mikr.*, 1: pp. 393-398.

lectual life has always to do with an external reality which is eternally impenetrable to it.”¹ It is faith in the essential moral veracity of the world, as well as in its essential rationality, that stings him to revolt against that view which represents thought as missing its mark, as aiming at things *per se*, but perforce contenting itself with ‘mere phenomena.’ On the contrary, reality does not elude thought; reality is not a hidden world of noumena, it is the world we know in experience.² Epistemologically, then, the world of reality is a unity. That the unity of the ultimate principle is at bottom an ethical demand even more than a speculative, can appear fully, however, only when inquiry has been made into the nature of the Unit Being, and this inquiry must be left for a subsequent chapter.

The second of Lotze’s early prejudices, the conviction that the intellectual life is more than thought, springs obviously from an ethical root. He means here cognitive thought, and he recognized in the mental life other data than those of cognition, and other ends than those of theoretical knowledge. Thought is the instrument for the apprehension of truth; feeling, or ‘reason appreciative of worth,’ for the apprehension of value. The good belongs to the realm of value, which, Lotze held, is related to the realm of truth as end to means. But whatever the relation which may finally be established between the two realms, we are not warranted at the start in giving truth the precedence of value, or in making cognition superior to the practical reason.

¹ *Kl. Schr.*, 3 : p. 453.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 396–397.

CHAPTER II.

LOTZE'S IDEA OF THE GOOD ; ITS PLACE IN HIS SYSTEM.

PFLIEDERER, who is perhaps the most sympathetic of his critics, characterizes Lotze's philosophy as a lofty ethico-religious Idealism upon the basis of a moderate and cautious realism.¹ The Idea of the Good is in a peculiar sense the dominating idea of Lotze's system. The Good is the ground of all that is, and the end for which everything is as it is. Actuality is not a mere course of the world, it is the 'kingdom of God.'² The meaning of the world is what comes first, Lotze says in the conclusion to the *Metaphysik*. This meaning is not simply something which subjected itself to the order established ; rather from it alone comes the need of that order and the form in which it is realized. Elsewhere Lotze affirms that "all metaphysical truth consists only in the forms which must be assumed by a world that depends upon the principle of the Good."³ It is the purpose of this chapter to develop Lotze's conception of the Good, to show in a general way its significance for his system, and to point out certain ethical ideas derived from this primary conception which determine, in large measure, his characteristic metaphysical doctrines.

Lotze begins always with experience, with the empirical facts that lie close at hand. The unity which philosophy seeks with sure instinct must be for him a unity found by the converging of the threads of the manifold. To the theoretical reason no such unity is apparent. On the contrary, what we find is a diversity of elements apparently irreducible and ultimate : "All our analysis of the cosmic order ends in leading back our thought to a consciousness of necessarily valid *truths*, our perception to the

¹Pfleiderer : *Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung*, pp. 62-63.

²*Ph. of Relig.*, § 80.

³*Outl. of Met.*, § 93.

intuition of immediately given *facts* of reality, our conscience to the recognition of an absolute standard of all determinations of *worth*.”¹ Lotze speaks of these as ‘elemental forms of our knowledge’² and as ‘realms’ or ‘powers.’³

This cleavage of our universe into the realms of truth or universal law, reality, and worth, presents a problem insolvable by the theoretical reason. We are not able to embrace all three in one comprehensive notion, or from any one to obtain the others by logical deduction. The three involve one another, imply one another, but the connection is obscure. The necessary truths, or universal laws, tell us merely what must follow from given conditions. They are hypothetical in their nature, they never state what is, but only what must be if something else is. They do not give us reality, but they imply reality. On the other hand, reality as given to us in intuitions is never presented as necessary; it simply *is*. Other and quite different forms of reality are conceivable. Again, our ideas of worth do not point to a definite world of forms as their proper consequence; they attach themselves to but a part of the content of reality, and are imperfectly realized therein.⁴ This incoherence baffles thought, which aims at unity, and is moreover the source of perplexing doubts.

The key to Lotze's entire system is found in his conviction that these three realms are ultimately one.⁵ There is but one real power and this appears to us “under a three-fold image of an end to be realized—namely, first some definite and desired Good, then, on account of the definiteness of this, a formed and developing reality, and, finally, in this activity an unvarying reign of law.”⁶ This view Lotze terms a confession of his philosophic faith. Near the end of the *Mikrokosmos* he speaks of it as the consummation towards which he has been all the while working, though without feeling entitled to make explicit use in the fore-

¹ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 461; cf. 3: pp. 610, 616.

² *Mikr.*, 3: p. 461.

³ *Outl. of Æs.*, § 8.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 461–462.

⁵ Cf. Pfeleiderer: *Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung*, p. 63; Thieme: *Der Primat der praktischen Vernunft bei Lotze*, pp. 21–26; Vorbrodt: *Prinzipien der ethik und Religionsphilosophie Lotze's*, p. 10.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 609–610.

going portion of his work of a philosophic view from which its parts taken separately might seem to be logically developed.¹ The final synthesis of Truth, Reality, and Worth is the goal of Lotze's thought, fore-shadowed from the start; only from this final point of view are his metaphysical tenets thoroughly intelligible in themselves and in their combination as a system. The one real principle is the Highest Good;² this is the genuine reality "in the sense that all else is in relation to it, subordinate, deduced, mere semblance or means to an end."³ The whole sum of Nature is but the condition of the realization of the Good.⁴ Those principles gained by abstraction from the mode of behavior of 'things' and termed by us general laws,⁵ are but the formulæ of a universal mechanism by which the Good as Supreme Principle realizes itself.⁶ This is the meaning of Lotze's statement that the beginning of Metaphysic lies in Ethics, that the ground of what *should* be is to be sought in that which *is*.⁷ In this sense Lotze's system is a teleological Idealism; everything exists only by reason of the fact that it has its necessary place in the purpose which embraces all reality.⁸ The conviction of the supremacy of the Good Lotze declares to be the source of his respect for scientific investigation into the mechanical order of nature, as well as of his "obstinate refusal to see in all mechanism anything more than that form of procedure which is given by the highest reality to the living development of its content."⁹

Granting that the connection between the three realms is obscure, let us inquire a little further into this connection and the grounds for believing that it exists.

¹ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 459-460.

² *Outl. of Met.*, § 93; *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 620-623.

³ *Outl. of Met.*, § 92.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 1: p. 447.

⁵ *Outl. or Met.*, § 33.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 616-618.

⁷ *Met.*, *Schluss*.

⁸ Cf. Erdmann: *Hist. of Philos.*, p. 309; Santayana: *Lotze's Moral Idealism*, *Mind*, 1890.

⁹ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 622. Thieme points out that Lotze was indebted to Weisse for these three ideas. *Der Primat der praktischen Vernunft bei Lotze*, p. 26. In the primacy given to the ethical element we see the influence of Fichte as well.

As regards the world of reality, human reason and insight are helpless before the task of showing why the world should take just the forms we find in it in order to the realization of the end. Our knowledge of nature and of history is far too limited to admit of our tracing the development of the supreme principle. A boundless insight into nature, Lotze believes, would at least make it appear that reality is indissolubly connected with the realm of Worth and Good.¹ The plan of the universe in its details is necessarily hid from finite beings. The existence of evil and of sin in nature and in history presents an insurmountable difficulty to finite reason.² In fact, we are forced to admit a "chasm between the realm of ideas or final purposes, and the realm of real means."³

Lotze is strongly averse to the attempt to *deduce* the universe from a single principle. All such attempts are fore-doomed to failure, he believes. This has been the chief source of error, according to his thinking, in the great constructive systems of philosophy. To quote from the *Outlines of Metaphysics*: "Although we apprehend the Highest Good as the one real principle on which the validity of the metaphysical axioms in the world depend, we cannot regard it as a principle of cognition that can be profitably converted into a major premise from which to deduce the sum of metaphysical truth. . . . The very name, the Highest Good, designates the content, the *essentia* of the highest principle, but not the form of existence which we must attribute to it as a conditioning cause of the world of phenomena."⁴ The real world in all its varied forms can never be shown to be the inevitable consequence and expression of the principle of the Good. Lotze gives some suggestions as to the course that must be taken by arguments aiming at a thorough solution of this problem;⁵ yet all such arguments must inevitably be inadequate. Such proof alone, Lotze admits, could fully justify his belief that the sphere of mechanism is unbounded, but its significance everywhere subordinate.⁶

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 609.

² *Mikr.* 3 : p. 610.

³ *Outl. of Æs.* § 14.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 93-94.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 618-619.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 618.

Universally valid truths, also, though they cannot be deduced therefrom, are intelligible only with reference to the Idea of the Good.¹ That there is a realm of truth at all seems to Lotze conceivable only in a world the ultimate principle of which is ethical, and which has as its goal the realization of the Good.² Knowledge is not in itself an ultimate end; in the last resort it has worth only as offering a clue to the true meaning of existence.³ All ultimate principles, whether those of the theoretical reason, or of ethics and æsthetics, are intelligible only as expressions of an order realized in the world by the Good as the supreme principle. Order, indicating purpose, is the testimony of the world without us and the world within us to a dominating ethical principle. In the *Logik* Lotze shows that the speculative ideal itself points beyond logic to the content of a supreme principle which is the ultimate ground of the universal laws themselves, of the direction in which the world as a whole develops, and of the individual forms which reality assumes at each moment.⁴ In the conclusion to the *Metaphysik* we find the following statement: "All those laws which can be designated by the common name of mathematical mechanics, whatever that name includes of eternal and self-evident truths, and of laws which as a matter of fact are everywhere valid—all these exist not on their own authority, nor as a baseless destiny to which reality is compelled to bow. They are (to use such language as men can) only the first consequences which in the pursuit of its end, the living and active meaning of the world has laid at the foundation of all particular realities as a command embracing them all."

But while emphasizing the subordination of Reality and Truth to the Good, we must not forget that the three realms form *one* universe. The distinction of the three is a distinction for thought only. There is but one world-process, from which thought abstracts three elements—the field in which, the means by which, the end for which the whole is. There can be no separation of

¹ *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 619–620.

² Cf. Thieme: *Der Primat der praktischen Vernunft bei Lotze*, pp. 13–14; Vorbrodt: *Principien der Ethik*, p. 36.

³ *Mikr.*, Introd., pp. vi–viii.

⁴ *Logik*, § 151.

Truth from Reality ; the former is and is realized in the latter. No truth, no law "can exist within the world *before, outside, between, or above*, the 'things' concerning which it is assumed to hold good."¹ 'Law' is nothing else than the thing's mode of behavior. The 'thing' is its unvarying nature as expressed in its mode of behavior ; it is no kernel or core of reality apart from this ; its sole reality is its mode of action. The law, then, is the thing.² A general law is an abstraction corresponding to the abstract conception of thing.³ The superficial view by which Reality and the realms of Universal Law stand over against one another, must then be modified and corrected. There is no inert and plastic Reality which is subjected to the universal dominion of Law ; nor, on the other hand, is there any system of eternally valid Truths which exist prior to Reality and condition its form and action. Reality is activity in accordance with immanent law.

But neither can Reality and Truth be separated, save in thought, from the Good. The Good is not something apart from the world, hovering over it, as it were, and directing its progress towards a goal. The universe is One Being in whom Reality, Truth, and the Good, are indissolubly united. The Absolute Being may be conceived under differing aspects as the sole Reality, the Supreme Principle, or an Infinite Process, realizing an end. This Being, which must also be conceived as the highest and only true Personality,⁴ 'faith calls God.' Because in ethical attributes is found the most adequate expression of His nature, the idea of the Good is the fundamental conception.⁵ What is for metaphysics the World-Ground, is for the personal apprehension of man 'the Highest Good personal' ⁶ or 'Living Love.'⁷ For the Infinite there was "no Reality *within* which He had to realize His creation, nor laws which prior to Himself, *of them-*

¹ *Outl. of Met.*, § 96.

² *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 25, 26, 32, 34 ; *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 481.

³ *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 32-33.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 563-568 ; *Ph. of Relig.*, §§ 33, 41.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 615-623 ; *Ph. of Relig.*, § 81.

⁶ *Outl. of Met.*, § 92.

⁷ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 615.

selves determined what was possible and what was impossible.”¹ All that exists *is* but the Infinite Being ; on no other assumption is the ‘relatedness’ of things intelligible. Nor can we think of the Infinite as conditioned by a system of pre-mundane laws. That which we know as the sum of universal truths is but ‘the mode of action of Omnipotence.’²

The solution of this problem by thus resolving what seemed three irreducible elements of our world into one, a trinity within a unity, is a solution not afforded by the theoretical reason. It is not susceptible of proof. “In our theoretic cognition,” says Lotze, “we shall never get further than a faith founded on certain *motifs* that, nevertheless, in the totality of the world this perfect concord [that is, of the Good, Reality, and Truth] does take place.”³ The justification of this faith will appear more clearly when the concept of Value has been considered somewhat in detail, and to this we will now turn our attention.

The concept of Value, or Worth (*Werth*), holds an important place in Lotze’s philosophical system. It is, therefore, especially unfortunate that we have nowhere a full and systematic statement of his views on ethics, æsthetics, and religion, wherein the discussion of Value would find place. This is due chiefly to the fact that the third part of his *System*, that which was to contain the practical philosophy, was never completed. One must also deplore in Lotze’s treatment of this subject a certain confusion in the use of terms and a lack of careful analysis, in marked contrast with his close and cautious reasoning on metaphysical and logical subjects.

The concept of Value, as used by Lotze, includes both the Good and the Beautiful. In one connection, he adds to these the ‘happy,’ or ‘blessedness,’ as uniting with the Good and the Beautiful to form “one complex of all that has value.”⁴ Elsewhere he enumerates the good, the beautiful, and the holy, or

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 598.

² *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 589 ; Cf. 3 : pp. 606–607 ; *Ph. of Relig.*, §§ 48, 49, 54.

³ *Outl. of Æs.*, § 14 ; Cf. *Mikr.*, 4 : pp. 466, 612.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, § 92.

righteousness, as comprising our Ideas of what has worth.¹ In spite of some confusion here, it is clear enough that Lotze means to distinguish the judgment of worth from the merely cognitive judgment of fact or of truth. The content of the latter judgment is immutable but indifferent. The content of the former we pronounce 'beautiful' or 'good'; it is not indifferent to us, it has worth. In the *Philosophy of Religion*, Lotze examines the conception of a world-aim. Such an aim can be only that which has supreme value, and his conclusion is that only to happiness, or 'blessedness,' can supreme value be attributed.² Nothing other than 'blessedness' can be the world-aim, since "nothing else affirms itself so unconditionally and immediately in respect to its value."³ Only in regard to blessedness is the question absurd why *it* rather than something else should be the final purpose of the world. In just this end the goodness of the world consists. It is only in eternal blessedness that the final end of all world-faring is realized; this is the aim for the realization of which every thing is as it is, and every law of the world commands what it commands.⁴ But just as there is no pleasure in general, every pleasure having a definite content, so the world-aim of blessedness is not realizable in a general sense, but only in the concrete.⁵ We must turn our attention to the standard of value as apprehended by the individual.

The idea of worth can have meaning only with reference to a subject capable of sensibility;⁶ hence the importance of the feelings as affording the basis of all judgments of value. All values, says Lotze, are apprehended primarily by means of feelings of pleasure and pain: "There is nothing at all in the world which would have any value until it has produced some pleasure in some being or other capable of enjoyment."⁷ It is feeling that makes us aware of the world of values under the world of forms,⁸

¹ Cf. *Pract. Philos.*, § 12.

² *Philos. of Relig.*, § 66.

³ *Outl. of Æs.*, § 13.

⁴ Cf. *Kl. Schr.*, 3: p. 539; *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 309-310.

⁵ Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 66, 69, 79.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 614.

⁷ *Pract. Philos.*, § 8; Cf. *Mikr.*, 1: p. 280.

⁸ *Mikr.*, 1: pp. 272-273.

and so gives us the key to the meaning of our universe. The all-pervading mechanism of nature finds its goal in an inner world of pleasure and of finite enjoyment.¹ Vorbrodt believes that it is not too much to say that feeling is for Lotze, as will for Wundt, the primary function out of which all others grow.² It is certainly essential to a comprehension of Lotze's system that his doctrine of the feelings as the instrument of value be clearly understood. No principle of his philosophy has been more severely criticised, and none is perhaps more open to criticism.

Primarily, the standard of value is pleasure-pain. From this purely subjective and individual experience, an objective and universal standard emerges later, as an attempt will be made to show; but the elementary feelings of pleasure and pain form the basis of all those judgments of worth which constitute so important a part of the activity of the human mind. In the *Medizinische Psychologie*, Lotze discusses the mechanism of the feelings in their significance for psychical life.³ The capacity to respond to excitations with feelings of pleasure and pain is the distinctive characteristic of the physical life he attributes to things. If an atom of a so-called material mass be supposed to have a soul life, it is not necessary to grant it *ideas*, but we must attribute to it this primal experiencing of pleasure and pain.⁴ Nothing is *real* that does not feel as well as act; reciprocal action implies necessarily a being that feels, that measures crudely the value of its inner states by joy and desire, pain and aversion. There can be no action without passion.⁵ Pleasure and pain finally reduce to reaction to stimulation in harmony with, or opposed to, vital evolution.⁶

Pleasure-pain is, furthermore, the basis of self-consciousness, and therefore of personality. Not in the relation of thought to the thinker, but in feelings of pleasure and pain is the Ego first

¹ *Mikr.*, 2: p. 320.

² Vorbrodt: *Principien der Ethik u. s. w.*, pp. 11, 15.

³ See *Med. Psy.*, Buch 2, Kap. 2.

⁴ *Med. Psy.*, pp. 133-134, 234; cf. *Mikr.*, 1: p. 269; *Kl. Schr.*, 2: p. 82 f.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 525.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 1: pp. 269-271; 2: p. 315; *Outl. of Psy.*, § 48.

conscious that its individual states belong to it, are its own.¹ For this self-feeling the simpler experiences are adequate no less than the higher and more complex. Without it the "consummate intelligence of an angel could not rise to the knowledge of itself as an Ego"; with it "the crushed worm undoubtedly distinguishes its own suffering from the rest of the world." To each stimulation from the outer world the soul reacts with feeling as well as sensation. A special pleasure or pain corresponds originally to each simple sensation, and this element of feeling measures the value of the stimulation for the individual.² To the sensation the mind responds with a judgment of being; to the feeling, with a judgment of value. Judgments of being express facts; judgments of value, the worth of these facts.³

Feelings of pleasure and pain, therefore, point beyond mere sentiency, their value is not merely subjective and individual. It is the distinctive characteristic of human sentience that we not only never apprehend sense-impressions as indifferent contents, but also that in the accompanying feelings we never become aware merely of a value for us, but of an intrinsic value as well.⁴ This judgment (*Beurtheilung*) of value is never wholly absent even in case of the lower senses, where it is suppressed by the intensity of self-reference, but becomes increasingly prominent in the higher senses, until in sound and color almost every trace of egoistic interest may be effaced.⁵ There is a "tendency to see in the nature of external things a virtue peculiar to themselves, an immediate worth or the reverse, recognized by our pain or pleasure but not dependent on their presence."⁶ Thus feeling, even in its simplest and most primitive manifestations, shows an inclination to transcend the individual. In its recognition of an intrinsic worth in things, it postulates a realm of objective values. At the moment that it announces itself to consciousness as the

¹ *Mikr.*, 1: p. 280; 2: pp. 313-314; *Outl. of Psy.*, §§ 52-53; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 37.

² *Mikr.*, 1: p. 272; 2, p. 182.

³ Cf. Thieme: *Der Primat der praktischen Vernunft bei Lotze*, pp. 5-9.

⁴ *Werth an sich*, *Mikr.*, 2: p. 185. Cf. also *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 217-218, 321.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 187-188.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 2: p. 193.

well-being or ill-being of the organism, it also points away from the subjective and particular experience to a universal and sovereign order.¹ But feeling further serves as the basis of the highest activity of intelligence—that of ‘reason appreciative of worth.’² As inspiring and guiding the Ideals of reason, feeling realizes its highest function. In its judgments of worth, reason likewise fulfils its highest destiny. Here, as in the simplest sense experience, the feeling of pleasure or pain yields the data on which the judgment is based. This true function of feeling becomes clear as we consider its relation to the æsthetic, moral, and theoretical Ideals. An Ideal, as the term itself implies, is a product of thought. However based upon and rooted in the immediate and particular, an Ideal is universal, conceptual. As such, it implies necessarily the activity of thought. Feeling may enter into account as a determining factor of much importance, but an Ideal can not be a feeling-product merely.

In his treatment of æsthetics, Lotze insists that we apprehend the beautiful only in the form of an Idea, or an Ideal.³ Primarily, indeed, beauty consists in the subjective feeling of æsthetic pleasure; but we are speedily under the necessity of attributing an objective reality to the beautiful. It claims a universal validity which is not satisfied in the individual pleasure.⁴ We have seen that the general Idea of Beauty implies reference to purpose, to a world-plan in which the end to be realized, the reality in which, and the laws by which, it is realized, are believed to be perfectly synthesized.⁵ Any object is beautiful in the degree that it presents this congruity of means, law, and end, and thus conforms to and suggests the general Idea of Beauty. It is enough to note here that the æsthetic judgment is based upon the immediate feeling of pleasure in the contemplation of the beautiful object, but involves a reference to an Ideal of universal and absolute worth. The value of the beautiful object consists not in the merely

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 341–342.

² *Einer werthempfindenden Vernunft. Mikr.*, 1: p. 274. Cf. *Mikr.*, 1: p. 276, *werthbestimmenden Vernunft.*

³ *Outl. of Æs.*, § 7.

⁴ Cf. *Outl. of Æs.*, §§ 1–2, 4–6, 16.

⁵ *Outl. of Æs.*, §§ 10, 23.

sentient pleasure it gives us, but rather in the apprehension of a teleological meaning of the world which the pleasure serves to indicate. Here we find implied the activity of a worth-determining reason.¹ The immediacy of the judgment of beauty as based upon feeling, and the idea of purpose involved in the judgment, are doubtless to be traced to the influence of Kant's third *Critique*.

The moral Ideals of the practical reason are likewise the outgrowth of an appreciative feeling.² Ethical ideals vary with degree of culture and are in large measure the result of culture. Morality never depends on culture alone, however; it has its roots in the constitution of the mind, and rests on a basis of feeling.³ The feeling of pleasure, Lotze asserts with the utmost emphasis, is the positive basis of the judgment of moral value. An indissoluble connection exists between the notion of pleasure and the notion of worth.⁴ The fear of Hedonism has often led to the statement that the good is pleasing because it is good, not good because it is pleasing. This caution Lotze repudiates as unnecessary, and boldly asserts that to be good and to be pleasing designate exactly one and the same thing.⁵ The way in which he further defines his meaning serves, however, somewhat to modify this statement. The pleasurable feeling, he says, is the sole means by which the specific and inherent value of things is realized, just as light "must illumine things in order that their different colors, which they do not have in darkness, may originate." That is, the feeling of pleasure is the medium and index of a value that is not purely subjective. Pleasure is the only absolutely self-assertory end, since every other may be called in question, while this alone is a self-evident good.⁶ If obedience or disobedience to ethical law were to occasion no trace of pleasure or pain to any sensitive being, it would be utterly incomprehensible why just the obedience and not the disobedience should have obligatory force.

¹*Mikr.*, I : pp. 273-274.

²*Mikr.*, I : p. 276.

³*Mikr.*, I : p. 277.

⁴*Mikr.*, 2 : p. 316 f.; *Pract. Philos.*, § 7.

⁵*Pract. Philos.*, § 8.

⁶*Pract. Philos.*, § 4.

⁷*Philos. of Relig.*, § 67; *Pract. Philos.*, § 9.

"It is impossible to understand what is to constitute the 'value' of any action if its results are not able to produce some 'good' . . . and this latter always exists only in the pleasure of some sensitive spirit."¹ Many statements might be quoted from Lotze's various works which assert as strongly as any of the foregoing the primary dependence of ethical value upon the feeling of pleasure.² Moreover, ethics has to do with conduct, action ; and pleasure and pain are the springs of practical activity.³

This is by no means the whole account of the matter, however. We straightway find new factors entering in, which modify the hedonistic estimate, and lead to a new standard of value. There is no such thing as abstract pleasure, pleasure in general, which can be reduced to the merely qualitative determination of greater or less. On the contrary, every pleasure is specific, it is pleasure in *something*, and therefore differs qualitatively from every other pleasure.⁴ Thus every feeling of pleasure leads away from the self and its agreeable consciousness to an objective excellence. This is the first remove from egoism, and proves that pleasure posited as an end in itself involves a logical absurdity.⁵

While egoism is theoretically the only motive power of our activity, as a matter of fact its inadequacy is soon obvious.⁶ It contains an internal contradiction which is, as it were, the germ of a higher principle. Not only is its earliest reference to some object external to the self, but the object of desire is also early transformed from the sensible to the ideal.⁷ Moreover, the egoistic impulse is constantly checked and thwarted by the external conditions of life.⁸ But further, the very egoism which prompts to a comparison of one's self with others, by this very act forces the recognition of some well-established standard and ground of comparison. The superiority in which egoism finds satisfaction would lose its value if it were wholly unique. It is a superiority shared with

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 67.

² See *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 308-310 ; 313-333.

³ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 313-316.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 321 ; *Pract. Philos.*, § 8 ; *Outl. of Psy.*, § 49.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 320.

⁶ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 327.

⁷ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 324-325.

⁸ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 327.

others, albeit rare, and as such it must be intelligible in itself by reference to universal notions.¹ "The hidden shackle which egoism carries about with it in its inevitable dependence upon the justification of a universal is very soon transformed into an external bond."² Continual reference to the judgment of others tends to supplant the individual by the universal, and to bind each individual to his fellows. The 'unconquerable impulse towards imitation' assists this non-egoistic tendency. Hence a capacity for self-subordination, for self-conquest through higher ideals of conduct and character, and the basis of genuine moral evolution.³

Conscience enters into account to modify still further the egoistic character of feeling. Lotze does not define precisely what he means by conscience. It is evidently conceived by him as a rational principle which presupposes, however, an original 'sense of obligation' as an essential characteristic of the human mind.⁴ To a certain kind of excitation the mind reacts according to its nature with what we term moral feelings and judgments. The definite content of our ethical ideals can only be developed through experience.⁵ The notions of Good and good things are reached through conscience on the basis of feeling. Conscience approves and enjoins certain dispositions and actions, and these we term good. Such a thing as a moral judgment of conduct is possible only on the assumption that such conduct leads to pleasure and pain.⁶ When conscience prescribes practical laws the conduciveness of which to our happiness we do not directly see, we yet assume that it is there.⁷ An unconditioned *ought* is unthinkable.⁸ Conscience further reveals to us the different values of pleasures; that is, it assigns to the various pleasures their rank as higher or lower in the scale of worth.⁹ The effort to attain pleasure conscience pronounces to be in itself natural and without

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 328-330.

² *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 331.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 332-340.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 312, 342.

⁵ Cf. *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 311; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 76.

⁶ *Pract. Philos.*, § 15.

⁷ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 319-320.

⁸ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 79.

⁹ *Pract. Philos.*, § 9; *Mikr.*, 2 : 322.

blame, but not in the least degree meritorious. Only such conduct as is not determined by the end of personal pleasure receives this latter ascription of value.¹ Only the satisfaction of conscience itself is exempt from all fluctuations of value.² "We should not even call good the frame of mind of him who, by a choice involving no sacrifice, should simply prefer the worth which is greater, both objectively and to him, to the worth which is lesser; on the contrary, that which for the feeling mind is the nearest and most urgent worth, must be sacrificed to some other worth, which to it, as feeling, is not greater—the welfare of self must be sacrificed to the content of a supreme command."³ Had egoism any claim to supremacy left it, we should find the last trace of such a claim repudiated by the fact that conscience further enjoins benevolence as the supreme principle of conduct.⁴

Thus, as in the case of æsthetic Ideals, so also at the basis of the moral Ideals we find pleasure and pain affording the data of the practical reason's determinations of worth. As before, we find also a rational principle present at the very beginning, manifest in the simplest assignment of value to an immediate object. This rational principle increases in potency until in the ideas of a moral world-order, of universally valid moral law, of the dignity and destiny of man as a moral being, that which is of merely immediate and subjective value for feeling is quite transcended. Feeling itself, however, is not transcended. It is present from first to last; without it there is no apprehension of value whatever.

In this connection, and before proceeding to consider the influence of feeling in the formation of the Ideals of the theoretical reason, it may be well to ask in how far Lotze has succeeded in maintaining a middle ground between Hedonism and Rationalism. It is quite consistent with his general philosophical position as a mediator between empiricism and idealism that Lotze should see the truth in both these opposed ethical theories, for Hedonism may be regarded as the expression of ethical realism,

¹ *Pract. Philos.*, § 4.

² *Mikr.*, 2: p. 323.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 614.

⁴ *Pract. Philos.*, § 15; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 68.

and Rationalism the expression of ethical idealism.¹ He saw clearly the necessity of admitting both sensibility and reason as factors in moral life. He recognized with equal clearness the errors involved in any attempt to resolve morality into either feeling or reason, to the exclusion of the other. He has not, however, it seems to me, been wholly successful in showing how the two elements must be harmonized in a complete theory.

In his criticism of Hedonism, Lotze has, with great acuteness, put his finger upon the exact spots of weakness in the argument. The notion of pleasure as the end of action is absurd, he says, since it is always an *object* which is aimed at, and not the feeling excited.² This is the distinction that Professor James makes between a pleasant act and an act pursuing pleasure.³ Lotze sees also, with J. S. Mill, that pleasures must be distinguished qualitatively; he further sees what Mill failed to see, that such a qualitative distinction is incompatible with the hedonistic theory. Lotze recognizes also in ethical commands an obligatory value and majesty which is beyond the scope of the hedonistic measure.⁴ He does not fail to emphasize the rational element in moral experience and development. Even self-realization as the end falls under his condemnation as essentially egoistic. The 'self-enjoyment of one's own fair personality,' he contends, is not the true end of life.⁵

On the other hand, Lotze has criticised no less keenly the extreme rationalistic ethics. The purely formal character of the Kantian ethics is revolting to him.⁶ "An unconditioned 'ought' is unthinkable; and only a conditioned 'ought' is possible which attaches advantages and disadvantages to the observance or non-observance of what is prescribed."⁷ Again, he says: "No ethics can avoid having reference to a purpose that is final and in itself of absolute value. No matter to what extent many rigorous

¹ See J. Seth: *Principles of Ethics*, p. 152.

² *Mikr.*, 2: p. 321.

³ James: *Principles of Psychology*, II, pp. 555-558.

⁴ Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 77-78.

⁵ *Pract. Philos.*, § 29.

⁶ *Pract. Philos.*, § 5.

⁷ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 79.

systems formulate their highest ethical laws apparently without any such regard, still, in addition to the assurances that they are the highest laws, the conclusion must always be supplied: what then would be the result if these laws were not obeyed?"¹

Lotze's way of treating the ethical problem suggests his solution of the epistemological problem. Just as knowledge is the result of the mind's reaction upon data given in sense, so morality depends ultimately upon data given in feeling. Both sensation and feeling are subjective, but in the case of both it is true that the subjective experience is taken by reason as the index of something objective. In both cases we must suppose an original activity of mind and a further work of elaboration in thought. Thus far Lotze's ethical theory is intelligible, and commends itself by its recognition of both feeling and reason as indispensable factors. In finding the ultimate criterion of value in the pleasure produced in sensitive beings, however, Lotze finally reverts to the position of Hedonism. After building up an ethics out of sensibility and reason, in the end he finds the supreme good in sensibility. Reason, judging of worth by the aid and inspiration of feeling, finds its goal not in an objective, but in a subjective good.²

Now this position, it seems to me, logically implies the denial of that which Lotze seeks most strenuously to prove—the validity of our moral ideals. In order to this, ethical value must be conceived as objective as well as subjective. To quote words which put this with clearness and force: "The objectivity of good is no less essential than the objectivity of truth. To make truth subjective, to resolve the object of knowledge into the experience or consciousness of the knowing subject, were to destroy truth and knowledge. . . . Intellectual subjectivity means intellectual scepticism, or the decentralization of knowledge. And to make the good subjective, to resolve the ethical object into the experience or consciousness of its subject, is, no less inevitably, to destroy the good. . . . If we are to avoid moral skepticism we must avoid ethical subjectivity, or the decentralization of the good."³ We have seen that Lotze assigns an objective worth

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 67. Cf. *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 317-320.

² Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, § 67; *Pract. Philos.*, § 8.

³ J. Seth: *Principles of Ethics*, p. 120.

to things, a worth of which the subjective experience is the index. We have then a world of objective values. But in what does the value of things consist? Lotze's answer is that things possess value, after all, only in that and in so far as they produce pleasure in sensitive beings. But this is to turn back upon his own track, to deny objective value, and to lapse into Hedonism.¹ And yet it is unfair to attach to a man's theory a name which is not only distinctly repudiated by him, but which is in fact contradicted by important elements in his doctrine. A hedonist Lotze is not, in spite of his reversion to the hedonistic standard. This final reference of objective values to the pleasure of sensitive beings is quite extraneous and contradictory to his ethical doctrine. The truth seems to be that while Lotze saw clearly the inadequacy both of reason and of sensibility as the sole standard of value, and readily granted that both must be taken into account, yet he failed to apprehend the manner of their synthesis in moral life. Not only so, but he failed to apprehend clearly the lack of such a synthesis and the need of one. The result of this double failure is the vacillation that we have noted regarding the standard of worth. As it stands, his theory is unsatisfactory in that it contains contradictory elements. To be just to Lotze, however, we must again remember that his theory of ethics was never put forth in systematic completeness. An attempt to do this would very likely have revealed to him the inconsistencies of his position.

Let us turn from this excursion into Lotze's ethics to resume the course of our discussion. The feelings have an important function in the formation of the Ideals of the theoretical reason as well as in æsthetic and moral Ideals. This function will appear most clearly perhaps if we consider feeling as influencing theory, and as affording a criterion of truth.

'Reason appreciative of worth' yields the Ideals of the speculative activity. Lotze here distinguishes reason (*Vernunft*)

¹ The mere fact that Lotze makes benevolence the fundamental ethical principle, does not, of course, save his theory from Hedonism. This easy transition to an altruism that interprets the good as another's pleasure, even to the denial or exclusion of one's own, is as obvious a makeshift to avoid the full consequences of Hedonism as when Mill maintains that in order to obtain happiness it must not be explicitly sought.

from understanding (*Verstand*) by just this difference, that the understanding is purely cognitive, disinterested, but reason is a higher and more characteristically human activity; it is cognizant of worth, and "rejects even the thinkable so long as it is only thinkable, and does not besides by the inherent excellence of its content win recognition of its worth in the world."¹ "If we examine our theory of the universe as the matured product of culture, we find it to a large extent determined by the requirements of our reason. For example, the effort to unify by bringing together particulars under a general law, and general laws under principles of yet wider application, is a dictate of the worth-determining reason. This is an ideal which inspires scientific research, and it is the crowning conception of philosophy."² "In its feeling for the value of things and their relations," says Lotze, "our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as in the principles of logical investigation it has an indispensable instrument of experience."³

But feeling further must be taken into account as an aid in establishing the criterion of truth. All ultimate principles, theoretical and practical alike, rest upon the strength of their own self-evidence. They neither need nor are capable of proof. The criterion of their validity consists wholly in the immediate clearness and certainty with which they thrust themselves upon us as necessarily true.⁴ The whole structure of thought and of practical life is built upon these foundation-stones. We can no more doubt them than we can doubt our own existence. The real ground of our confidence lies beyond cognition, in reason appreciative of value through feeling. For it is quite possible to ask with Descartes whether we are not so constituted that what is false must yet appear to us to be necessarily true. In the face of this scepticism "we are left with nothing but the confidence of reason in itself, . . . the certainty . . . that there is a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that reality which includes us in itself has given our spirits only such necessities of thought

¹ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 273-274; Cf. *Outl. of Psy.*, §§ 100-101.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, 2: p. 274.

³ *Mikr.*, 2: p. 275.

⁴ Cf. *Logik*, §§ 200, 301; *Outl. of Logic*, § 70; *Kl. Schr.*, 3, pp. 529, 540-541.

as harmonize with it.”¹ In the immediate assurance which we feel of the *worth* of the world and of the world-order lies the security for the truth of our knowledge.² Our confidence in ultimate principles, then—a “confidence which logic can never justify, but which lies at the foundation of all logic”³—is nothing else than a moral and æsthetic faith grounded in the conviction of their worth. We are warranted “in passing from the incontestable *value* of an object of thought to a belief in its reality,” Lotze says. Though they have the appearance of committing a fallacy, such beliefs in fact “rest upon an extremely broad, though unanalyzed foundation of perception; . . . starting from the reality of *a* as given in experience, they connect with it the reality of *b*, which is not so given, but which appears to follow from *a* as a necessity of thought.”⁴ It is really faith in the moral integrity of the universe which demands that what the thinking spirit is constrained to believe to be true, shall be true. The æsthetic condemnation of a world hopelessly disordered and unmeaning is closely allied to the ethical demand, but is of secondary importance. As we have seen, at the root of all judgments of value lies feeling; and thus feeling lends its aid to reason in affording the criterion of truth.

Here it may be well briefly to notice the criticism of Lotze's doctrine of the feelings by Professor Jones. The gist of this is, that Lotze has assigned to feeling, one by one, the functions of thought. Feeling with its consciousness of worth yields the judgment of value; feeling must inspire knowledge, give the impulse to know; feeling supplies the cognitive ideal, affords the criterion of truth, guarantees the principles of thought, and “fills its otherwise empty forms with the value which alone renders them adequate to reality.”⁵ Thought thus shorn of its pretensions becomes a mere formal, arranging activity, and can never yield knowledge.⁶ Jones asks very pertinently whether feeling

¹ *Outl. of Met.*, § 94.

² Cf. *Logik*, § 303.

³ *Ibid.*, § 349.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 348.

⁵ Jones, *Doctrine of Thought*, pp. 57–60, 70–72.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 283.

can yield the judgment of value apart from and without the coöperating activity of thought. Can the *feeling* of pleasure or pain be identified with the *judgment* of value?¹ Surely not; but I do not so understand Lotze. The foregoing discussion has failed of its purpose if it has not shown the writer's belief that Lotze's doctrine necessarily implies the activity of thought operative upon the data of feeling from the first. The judgment of value is based upon feeling; it is not pronounced by feeling. Feeling waits upon sensation, though it is not reducible to sensation. Sensation yields data for the judgment of reality, feeling for the judgment of value. Feeling, unaided, can no more give us value, than can sensation, unaided, give us knowledge.² An attempt has been made to show how feeling enters into the Ideals of the practical and the theoretical reason; but in no case does it assume the functions of thought in so doing. Feeling, alone, cannot be said to afford the criterion of truth on Lotze's view, it seems to me. Ultimate principles rest upon their own self-evidence; they are necessities for our thought. The final ground of our conviction of their validity is in our conviction that the world has worth and meaning. But this conviction is itself a judgment—the summing up, as it were, of all our judgments of worth. It could never be reached by thought independently of feeling, and surely never by feeling independently of thought.

The source of the error in this interpretation of Lotze is to be traced, I believe, to a misconception of the meaning of the term 'feeling' as used by him. 'Feeling' is sometimes used by Lotze to signify mere sentiency, mere unmediated experience. It not infrequently, however, connotes a far richer content, one that is mediated and verified by our entire cognitive experience. To urge the former of these uses and ignore the latter, is hopelessly to confuse and distort Lotze's doctrine. Professor Jones seems to me quite justified, however, in his complaint that Lotze "has not sufficiently analyzed feeling, to lay bare the presence of thought in its data, and to show unmistakably the emptiness and unintelligibility of these data apart from thought."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 297-298.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I : p. 272; p. 182; 2 : p. 322. *Outl. of Psy.*, §§ 49-50.

³ See Jones, *Doctrine of Thought*, p. 302.

In his concept of Value and his doctrine of the feelings as the means of its apprehension, we find the clue to Lotze's hostility to Hegel. His recoil from Absolute Idealism no less than from Materialism determined his philosophical attitude. Even his earlier works contain criticisms of Hegel,¹ and the later works abound in them. At every point he finds cause of revolt against the Hegelian doctrine as he conceived it. We may hesitate to agree with Caspari when he says, "*Man darf mit vollen Rechte sagen: Lotze hatte Hegel überwunden.*"² Against his own interpretation of Hegel, however, Lotze's arguments seem quite conclusive. He objects to Hegel's doctrine for two reasons, which perhaps in the end reduce to one: First, any attempt at an *à priori* deduction of the world from one supreme principle, he deems futile and certain to lead to false conclusions. The empiricist in him, the cautious instinct of the man of science, revolts against such a proceeding as ignoring concrete facts. The second objection is very closely allied to this, namely, that Hegel's identification of logic with metaphysics, of thought with reality, ignores the concrete content of reality. A merely logical development postulated as the end and meaning of the world, Lotze contends, is a sacrifice of the wealth of content to the etiquette of form.³ In particular, there is involved the sacrifice of the individual life, the wealth and worth of personality. This is the argument to which Lotze recurs again and again in the chapter on "The Meaning of History."⁴ According to the view which he attributes to Hegel, individuals count for nothing in history; their efforts have no worth and significance in themselves, and their happiness and peace are not among the ends of historical development.⁵ Against what he deems the Hegelian deification of thought, Lotze insists upon the recognition of the entire content of consciousness. Experience is 'richer than thought,' is a phrase constantly reiterated by him. As we have seen, he believed that consciousness yields other data than those of cognition, and data of incal-

¹ Cf. *Outl. of Met.*, 1841, pp. 34-38; *Med. Psy.*, I, 3, § 14.

² Caspari, *Hermann Lotze*, p. 7.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 43-45, 463; *Kl. Schr.*, 3: p. 454; *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 11, 90, 177.

⁴ *Mikr.*, VII, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: pp. 33, 36, 38-39, 44.

culable significance for personality. To exalt cognition and ignore feeling is to "acknowledge only one-half, and that the poorer half of the world."¹ It is to "impoverish faith without enriching knowledge."²

It would be outside the scope of this inquiry to discuss the mooted question as to the true interpretation of Hegel, whether the thought which he equates with being is to be conceived as abstract or as concrete. If we agree with Caird, McTaggart, and others, that the thought of the dialectic is not thought as an element in experience, merely coördinate with sense, giving the form to experience while sense affords the matter, but, on the contrary, that it is thought that transcends the distinction between subject and object, and includes the object within itself,³ then thought is concrete, there is no denial of content, and Lotze's criticism of Hegel has missed its mark. On the other hand, any philosophy that finds in cognition the sole principle, and loses sight of the practical in the exaltation of the theoretical, is best met, as Lotze would meet it, by reference to personality, and the complete content of experience.

I have sought to show that the ethical element is so far predominant that Lotze's entire system is based upon the Idea of the Good. Out of this fundamental conception grow certain derivative ideas which serve, in some measure, as regulative ideals in the construction of all his metaphysical doctrines. These ideas are unity, teleology, and personality. The relation of these derivative ideas to the Idea of the Good is too obvious to need more than indication here. All three must receive further explanation and discussion in subsequent chapters. It has been pointed out that Lotze was committed to a unitary conception of the world for ethical reasons before he attempted his theoretical exposition of the World-Ground as necessarily a unitary being. There can be but one principle, as there is but one end. The idea of teleology is also implicit in Lotze's fundamental conception. The Good, as

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 44.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, 3 : pp. 536, 612 ; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 4 ; *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 87-90.

³ Cf. Hegel : *Logik*, I, 18-27, 46-48, 62.

conceived by Lotze, is an active principle which realizes itself in all reality. To justify his belief in a final purpose which prescribes the course of the world, is the chief aim of Lotze's philosophical undertaking. The *raison d'être* of the *Mikro-kosmos* is the harmonizing of the teleological with the mechanical view. The idea of personality likewise follows directly from the Idea of the Good and the concept of Value. Value can exist only for a spiritual being capable of apprehending it. The Good as supreme reality is in the highest degree personal. Human life has dignity only as it partakes of this attribute of God. In the subsequent chapters an attempt will be made to show how these ethical conceptions—personality, teleology, and unity,—underlie and condition Lotze's doctrine of the world, of man, and of God.

CHAPTER III.

CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD: THE WORLD TELEOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL.

ATTENTION will be confined in this chapter to two aspects only of Lotze's cosmology—the world as teleological and as spiritual. The problem of the unity of the world we shall reserve for later consideration in connection with Lotze's idea of God.

Both the fundamental conceptions with which we are here concerned are in themselves ethical, and are inspired by an ethical motive as well. Teleology—the doctrine of final causes—necessarily involves the concept of plan or end, which is essentially ethical in content. As used in ethics, this concept doubtless implies purpose consciously directed towards an end. Whether or not it is granted that teleology in the broad sense likewise contains this implication, it must at least be allowed that the teleological conception implies a goal whither things and events tend by forces inherent in them, or a plan within which things stand related as parts to a whole, and are perfectly intelligible only by reference to the whole. In this sense the concept is still ethical. Progress towards a goal implies a *good* realized by such progress; the recognition of a relation of parts to the whole implies a *meaning* which conditions this relation. Thus we are unable to avoid terms which have at least a distinct ethical reference.

The concept of spiritual existence is not less obviously ethical. To be spiritual is to exist for self, in some vague sense, at least. Self-existence is the *sine qua non* of ethical conduct—that is, of self-determination in distinction from determination by external forces. To be spiritual is the primary condition of personal being, and only personal beings are ethical, since for them only can the good be an end, or conduct be possible.

It is clear that ethical motives, also, impel Lotze to attribute a teleological and spiritual character to the world. His entire philosophical activity has its spring in the effort to vindicate the reality of ideal ends. He steadfastly maintains the right to seek such vindication. The practical reason, originating in feeling and ripened into judgment, constrains to seek an interpretation of reality in accord with its ideals of worth. To be inspired and guided thus is as justifiable—nay, as inevitable—as to be inspired and guided by the theoretical reason. Lotze's fundamental conception of the cosmos makes purpose supreme. The teleological view has a value which can not be gainsaid, and which demands a theoretical solution of the problem presented by reality. Lotze's insistence on the spiritual character of the world grows out of his conception of value as apprehended by feeling, and the ethical demand that everything that is real shall not merely exist, but enjoy its existence.

Science has accustomed us to the thought of law as the fundamental aspect of the world, Lotze says in his introduction to the *Metaphysik*;¹ but, in truth the idea of plan or end was the original norm of investigation. It was not as instances of a universal rule that men first conceived things, but as parts of a whole, as bound together 'by the unchangeable purport of a plan.' This idea of the universe, Lotze adds, is the true one, but, unfortunately, barren of results when made the starting-point of speculation. We have to do with a concrete reality, rich and manifold, and only after an exhaustive study of the world as we find it, could we hope to speak with confidence of a plan that unites all the particulars into one organic whole. Yet, even the short-sighted and perhaps distorted view of nature which each of us gains during a brief life-history, reveals a world in which there is much that is purposive, albeit in conjunction with much that is indifferent.² The system of universal and necessary laws seems to imply purpose.³ The fact that we live in a world of events rather than happenings is inexplicable otherwise. When such argu-

¹ *Met.*, § X.

² *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 31.

³ *Met.*, §§ 92-93 ; cf. §§ 27, 58-59.

ments as these are reinforced by the promptings of the moral and religious nature, we can readily account for the widespread conviction that the world is teleological.

But the teleological view straightway finds itself in conflict with a very different one, namely, the mechanical view of the world. If the former has a powerful ally in the spiritual insight and aspirations of men, the latter points with assurance to the splendid structure of natural science as its vindication, and to experience and reason as its sponsors. In his introduction to the *Mikrokosmos*, Lotze has outlined this struggle of opposing views, and defined as the aim of this notable work the reconciliation of the ideal and the mechanical explanations of the world. He was admirably fitted for the undertaking by his sympathy with the ideals of both science and philosophy. His intimate knowledge of science in several of its branches, and that familiarity with scientific methods which belongs only to the trained worker, made it impossible for him to undervalue or greatly to misinterpret the findings of science. Whether or not he was successful in his venture is a question upon which opinions will necessarily differ. The solution of any problem not a matter of demonstration must always remain doubtful; the same arguments appeal with unequal force to different minds, according to natural bias and all the subtle factors in personality.

Before we can decide as to the merits of the dispute between mechanism and teleology, it is necessary to get a clear notion of what is involved in the mechanical conception. As is usually the case with terms that are neither strictly technical, nor yet wholly relegated to ordinary speech, some confusion prevails.

Lotze calls attention to two inadequate and erroneous conceptions, which still prevail in some measure, and tend to obscure the truth. Mechanism as applied to natural phenomena has been used to describe sometimes a peculiar mode of activity, sometimes a particular class of effects. The notion which underlies this usage is in both cases untenable, Lotze maintains.¹ Mechanism as a distinct mode of action, a mere external action that takes no account of the inner relations of things, can nowhere be

¹ *Met.*, §§ 221-223.

found in nature. Even in the inorganic world, chemism, with its recognition of elements having specific qualities, opposes itself to this view. Every sort of natural process implies qualitative differences in things, and a mode of action determined by their inner nature. There is no action which is merely external.¹ Science may make use of such an abstraction, but let us not deceive ourselves by fancying it a reality. This view of the matter is closely related to Lotze's analysis of cause, and follows directly from his belief that reciprocal action depends upon the inner nature of things.²

But the idea of mechanism as applying to a special class of effects involves the same error.³ For we nowhere find in nature a special class of products due to mechanical activity, whether the term mechanical be interpreted in this external sense or in any other. If by mechanism we mean a merely external action, then there is nothing in nature which is so produced. Gravitation, motion, electrical and chemical action—all the forces we know—produce results dependent upon the nature of that upon which they act. But if by mechanism we mean action in accordance with universal laws, then every class of effects is produced by mechanical agency, and there is no reason for designating any particular class as mechanical in distinction from the rest.⁴

The mechanical conception of nature, of which Lotze is himself a zealous supporter, comprises two necessary features: It first regards nature as a universal system of law,⁵ and secondly, regarding every effect as produced in accordance with law, the mechanical view seeks to determine the effect with accuracy by ascertaining the *elements* and their action.⁶ Some necessary connection in things has always been sought since men began to think about the world in which they find themselves; and the thought that the world is a whole, and is to be accounted for as such, was early developed. By the mechanical conception, however, something different from this is meant. The conception of mechanism is rather that nature necessarily forms a whole, not

¹ *Met.*, § 221.

² *Met.*, §§ 56-57.

³ *Met.*, §§ 222-223.

⁴ Cf. *Mikr.*, XV; I: p. 488.

⁵ *Mikr.*, I: pp. 31-32.

⁶ *Mikr.*, I: p. 34.

only in its import, but in its laws ; that the various forms which nature assumes are distinguished from one another not by different laws, but by different modes of applying the same laws.¹ Nothing is isolated and alien. Everything stands in reciprocal relations with everything else. No form of existence evolves state out of state according to a law peculiar to itself. The law immanent in its nature is a universal law, because all things have to some extent a common nature. In the final analysis, nature's products differ, not in the kind, but in the combination of elements.² But, furthermore, in attempting a mechanical explanation of the world, science is forced to the analysis of the concrete wholes of experience into their parts. It is soon evident that there can be no law of the whole, save as the result of the action and interaction of the parts. And so natural science, pushing its analysis further and further, has been obliged to assume the existence of ultimate elements not perceptible to the senses, innumerable, indestructible, and unchangeable in their properties.³

It is important to notice here two points especially significant for Lotze's view. First, science is not concerned as to the *origin* of the elements ; it assumes them because they are necessary for explanation, but it does not assume that they are unconditioned.⁴ Further, as to the *nature* of the elements, it may be said that, in general, scientific interest centers not in what an element is, but in how it acts. Thus, while science may for its own purposes abstract from the nature of the elements, it can have no object in denying to them a specific nature. On the contrary, chemistry, at least, requires such an assumption. The scientific assumption that force inheres in the elements of the body with an unvarying mode of operation, implies, certainly, that these elements are not mere indifferent points, but rather that they act as they do by virtue of being what they are.⁵ In his discussion of the nature of elements, Lotze shows the influence of Fechner and of Herbart.⁶

¹ *Mikr.*, I : p. 84 ; cf. 2 : pp. 45-46.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 20-21, 32.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 34-37.

⁴ *Mikr.*, I : pp. 37-38.

⁵ Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 27, 38-40, 56 ; *Met.*, § 193.

⁶ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 188, 191.

The essential factors in the mechanical view, then, are that all occurrences in nature are events issuing in accordance with universal laws, and that all natural products are capable of analysis into ultimate elements whose modes of action are the laws that prevail throughout nature. The mechanical principle as thus conceived reaches over the whole domain of nature, inorganic and organic alike. We have seen that Lotze's scientific labors were directed chiefly towards one aim, to prove the validity of mechanical law as the principle of living bodies, in opposition to the 'vital force' theory.¹ A considerable portion of the *Mikrokosmos* also is devoted to showing the prevalence of mechanism in the human body. As we shall see later, mechanism extends its sway to the psychical life of man, and, in some measure, at least, to his moral life. Lotze insists that the mechanical principle is universal in extent.² Nor should we forget that to admit a universal mechanism meant more in Lotze's day than in our own. By most of Lotze's contemporaries he was understood to have committed himself to materialism—at least before the publication of the *Mikrokosmos*—and to be adding the force of his logic to strengthen that position.

But from Lotze's point of view, to admit mechanism is not to exclude teleology. The mechanical explanation is by no means final. Nowhere is mechanism the essence of the matter, Lotze insists.³ It is the point of view of science, which seeks to explain, not to interpret; it by no means excludes an interpretative view of nature.⁴ The mechanical view assumes its data in the world as given. Its task is the elaboration and explanation of these data. As we have seen, it asks no questions as to the origin of things, it simply accepts them as it finds them; or when, as in its search for elements, it is forced beyond sense, it assumes whatever is necessary for its purposes. In its explanation of things, the mechanical view seeks only the laws in accordance with which things act. It leaves unexplained the origin of things, the nature of things, and the action of things as proceeding from their nature.

¹ See also *Met.*, §§ 224–227.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 26, 28–29, 84, 154–156, 448–450 ; 3 : p. 618.

³ *Mikr.*, I : pp. 448, 451 ; *Met.*, § 229.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 6.

Hence mechanism leaves room for the teleological inquiry why things are as they are. To be sure, philosophy as well as science finds itself unable to push its inquiry back to the origin of things. It cannot hope to show why we have just the forms of reality that we have, nor why the laws of their action are precisely as they are. No man sees more clearly than Lotze the futility of such questionings, nor is any man further from accepting a cheap and easy teleology.¹ Yet the attempt to unify our knowledge, to comprehend the parts in relation to the whole, is natural and legitimate. A comprehensive view compels the intelligence to transcend the bare mechanical conception. The fact that the world is a cosmos, that truth, goodness, and beauty are realities for us, that *value* is, as well as fact—this is a view of the world that is great with import. Reason would seem to dictate the belief that a creative and progressive purpose is active in the selection and arrangement of the elements, and is thus the basis of that order which we find in the world.² To this conviction mechanism can not say nay, for it makes no pretence of affording an ultimate explanation of things.

Not only does the mechanical view of nature leave room for the teleological view, but it implies some such ulterior explanation. Order implies purpose, law implies end. Nature as a vast and complicated system of laws implies something wrought out thereby. A comprehensive view of things can but regard mechanism as a system of means to some end. Granting a supreme purpose animating all reality, what better instrument could possibly be devised for its realization than just such a system of mechanical laws as prevails? All finite things could then be conceived as acting in accordance with law immanent in the nature which is theirs by original endowment, and each having its own place and import in the plan which embraces the whole. All mechanism would be but the coherent system and means by which individual ends are realized within the unity of the whole. If such a system be conceived to exist, we can see how the form of it might be abstracted from particular instances, and come to

¹ See *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 17-32.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, 1 : p. 35 ; 2 : pp. 3-4, 24.

be regarded as mere law, mere necessity, quite apart from the ends which are realized by its means.¹

Lotze is not content, however, with showing that mechanism does not exclude teleology, or even that mechanism implies teleology. Any theory that aims at completeness, he confesses, "must comprise some definite representation of the relation in which in nature the *archetypal thought* must stand to the *efficient* causes of its representative *realization*."² It is characteristic of Lotze that his 'aim exceeds his grasp.' Some lack of constructive boldness, some excess of the cautious and critical spirit—or, it may be, a breadth and keenness of vision that revealed the scope of problems and the difficulties in the way—always held him back from presenting more than a hesitating and tentative solution. As to the case in hand, Lotze points out the inadequacy of two attempts at the reconciliation of the mechanical and teleological views, and from his criticism of these, as much as from any direct statements, we are able to infer his own view. The first of these is the anthropomorphic teleology that regards the world as a purposive creation, sustaining the same relation to God that our human products do to our adapting and designing wisdom. Lotze's chief objection to this view is that it postulates an alien material that first exists and then is wrought upon by God.³ The second seeks to avoid this fatal opposition of adaptive purpose and the means of its realization by blending the two as matter and form, the Ideal in the real. Here Lotze evidently has in mind Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Idealists of modern days. Without fully escaping the difficulty of the former view, this has the further defect of reducing the creative purpose to an unconscious reason.⁴

To explain his own position, Lotze has recourse to the standpoint set forth in the preceding chapter. Any complete theory of the universe must recognize a realm of universal laws, of Ideas of value, and of reality, or experience, boundless in the wealth of

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, 1: pp. 449-450; 2: pp. 46, 465; 3: pp. 616-619, 622-623. *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 70-75.

² *Mikr.*, 2: p. 9.

³ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 10-12.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 12-14.

its forms and events. In this wealth of reality we have to trace both the laws of all phenomena, and the Ideas which give worth to all being and doing.¹ The relation of reality, necessary laws, and Ideas of worth, must be organic. The true and complete teleology, according to Lotze's conviction, is that which recognizes reality as the field in which, and universal laws as the means by which, Ideas are realized. It is only at the close of the long argument of the *Mikrokosmos* that Lotze reaches this crowning conception, and feels that he has in some measure justified his belief that "the sphere of mechanism is unbounded, but its significance is everywhere subordinate."² He does not, however, leave the matter with quite the vagueness of this general conception. Closer examination shows, he maintains, "that in all the elements, a certain purposiveness in action not merely is compatible with, but ought hardly to be sundered from, the fundamental conceptions of the mechanical theory."³ Mechanism must needs assume an original nature of the elements, by virtue of which they manifest the properties characteristic of them. But grant that no action is merely external, that on the contrary the elements react according to their inner nature upon all stimulation from without, and you have opened a wide door for teleology. The possibility of an inherent purposiveness in things, of a tendency to evolve improving reactions, in a word, the possibility of progress towards a goal, becomes obvious.⁴

In the *Metaphysik*, Lotze links his teleology with his doctrine of the unity of all things in the World-Ground. Organic life, especially, implies purpose, and hence a conscious subject that conceives, wills, and realizes ends.⁵ Such a being can only be an immanent God. Law is intelligible only as the activity, the indwelling vitality, of the One Being, a real and potent presence in the innermost life of each element.⁶ But "the Absolute is no magician; it does not produce things in appropriate places out of a sheer vacuum."⁷ Rather it manifests itself in a plan which is developed according to a system of laws. Hence organic and

¹ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 15.

² *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 618; cf. pp. 616-620.

³ *Mikr.*, 2 : p. 34.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 35-44.

⁵ *Met.*, §§ 229-230.

⁶ *Met.*, §§ 230, 232-233.

⁷ *Met.*, § 233.

inorganic being are everywhere dependent on what we term mechanical causes, and exhibit a law of progress or evolution. This conviction is the ground of Lotze's "obstinate refusal to see in all mechanism anything more than that form of procedure—susceptible of isolation in thought—which is given by the Highest Reality to the living development of its content, which content can never be exhaustively expressed by this form alone."¹

Thus his defense and exposition of the teleological view of nature leads us back to, and is grounded in, his fundamental assumption, that of the supremacy of the Good as dictating the forms and laws of reality. At least we may say that this is a brave attempt to solve a long-vexed problem. And in making the attempt Lotze in no wise minimizes the difficulties of the undertaking; his is no superficial teleology that wins an easy triumph. His correction of the mechanical conception, showing the inadequacy of a mere external mechanism; his insistence upon the universal validity of the mechanical principle rightly understood; the clearness with which he points out the incompleteness of mechanism as a final explanation, and his noble attempt to prove a teleological principle active in the world through the instrumentality of a universal mechanism, all are features which give to his work a great and lasting value. For Lotze's own generation this work had a special value which it can have for no other. In our day the echoes of the strife which the last generation waged for and against the claims of science, are dying away. Science no longer makes pretensions to give the final explanation of the world-order, nor is it any longer provoked into a hostile attitude by misapprehension and distrust. Yet the opposition between the real aspect of things, and the ideal view which seeks to interpret this order, is perennial; and for this reason Lotze's argument in behalf of teleology has permanent value for philosophy.

That the ultimate elements which compose the world are in their essential nature spiritual, is a belief which Lotze held consistently throughout his life, and to which he gave expression in all his important works. There can be no doubt that he

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 622.

himself held this conception to be an intrinsic and necessary element in his system; to many it must seem accidental merely, a union of the poetic and the bizarre, the effect of which is rather to repel than to attract. It suggests the monadology of Leibniz, with some important modifications, however. The immaterial, soul-like atoms of Leibniz are isolated; the monads 'have no windows,' each lives its life within itself, sustaining no reciprocal relation with others. The theory of a pre-established harmony involved in this conception is distasteful to Lotze; it implies determinism, and denies to the monads the joy of active realization of ends. Such a world, he frequently repeats, would gain nothing by being realized.¹ His own monadology is explicitly based upon the concept of interaction, and presupposes the unity which Leibniz's world lacks.

The doctrine that the world is spiritual Lotze supports by two lines of argument, one of which is metaphysical, and the other ethical. He does not keep the two distinct, but passes over from the metaphysical argument to the ethical so easily as to suggest that the force of the latter is perhaps primarily greater with him, and influences his metaphysical theory to a degree of which he is unconscious. The metaphysical considerations which led Lotze to the doctrine in question, have to do with three closely related problems—that of the being of things, the unity of things, and the reciprocal action of things. These we will consider in brief before turning to the ethical argument.

In the *Metaphysik*, Lotze discusses at length the notion of the being or essence of the 'thing.' The first conclusion reached is that the 'thing' is not to be identified with its qualities, whether these qualities be conceived as sensible or as supersensible.² A thing is more than the sum of its qualities, its essence is not in them; the qualities change, none of them belong to the thing absolutely, but only under certain conditions. The thing is permanent in spite of changing states. All qualities are adjectives, and can be thought of only as predicates affirmed of a subject.³

¹ *Met.*, §§ 64-67.

² *Met.*, §§ 16-20; *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 516-519.

³ *Outl. of Met.*, § 17.

Things can not *be* qualities, but can only *have* them.¹ But, on the other hand, neither is the essence of things to be sought in a kernel or substratum, itself void of qualities. A core of reality, quite void of properties, can not become the basis of qualities. All possibility of change in things, of their assuming new forms, depends upon their having determinate properties by which they offer definite points of contact to the conditions operating upon them. Furthermore, this conception implies a world of isolated and alien things, and hence denies order and connection by natural law.²

The positive conclusion following these negative results is that the nature of the thing is to be sought only in its modes of action. The mode of behavior of a thing *is* its essence. A thing is 'a law of change'; its being is activity, change within fixed limits and according to a method of procedure peculiar to itself.³ This result is significant for the point in question, since it argues that the ordinary notion of things, at least, needs modification and correction. If Lotze's reasoning is sound, the 'thing,' instead of being fixed and inert, is essentially active, a permanent subject of changing states.

This brings us to the consideration of the unity of the 'thing,' which is the next step in Lotze's conception of the nature of things, and affords his proof that this nature is spiritual. The 'thing' is ever changing, yet we are obliged to assume a certain unity in the midst of change.⁴ A 'thing' appears in a series of forms; the concept of change involves the necessity of regarding all members of this series as 'states' of one and the same abiding reality.⁵ The 'thing' then must be conceived as the "subject of its own predicates," the "support of its own properties," that which maintains itself as a unity in the midst of change. Only one kind of being can sustain such a relation to its states, and that

¹ *Outl. of Met.*, § 19.

² *Met.*, §§ 28-29.

³ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 24, 26, 32, 34.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, § 22; *Met.*, § 96.

⁵ *Outl. of Met.*, § 36. The term 'states' Lotze admits is not a good one, but he uses it in default of a better.

is spiritual being.¹ A thing can be a unity only by opposing itself as such to the multiplicity of its states; it can be distinct from its states only by distinguishing itself from them.² The only case of such unity in multiplicity that we know we find in our own inner life. The only real unity that we are able to think, therefore, is the unity of spirit; only spirit can be the subject of states.³ "It is the *spirit* only which solves this riddle by memory, which through a living coherence in one consciousness of what is really successive first reveals to us the only possible meaning for the aforesaid unity."⁴

Lotze's conclusion is, then, that "all that is real is mind."⁵ What we call 'things' are better than they seem. There is no need to posit two different kinds of being in the world—spirit and something different from spirit;⁶ on the contrary, there can be no other form of existence than "spiritual beings like ourselves, which, in feeling their states and opposing themselves to their states as the unity that feels, satisfy the idea of a permanent subject."⁷ The demands made by the notion of 'things' can be met only by that which is of the nature of mind. But a further problem presents itself in the notion of the interaction of things, and this problem likewise demands, in order to its solution, that things be conceived as spiritual beings. "*To be is to stand in relations,*" Lotze repeatedly affirms.⁸ But to stand in relations can mean nothing else than reciprocal action.⁹ Everything stands in reciprocal relations with everything else. The very being of things consists in their sustaining these relations, in acting and being acted upon. This is the sole meaning of the activity which *is* the thing. But such reciprocal action of things implies the capacity of being affected and of producing effects.

¹ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 96–97; *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 521–523.

² *Met.*, § 96.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 522.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, § 83.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 531.

⁶ *Outl. of Met.*, § 83; *Met.*, § 248.

⁷ *Met.*, § 97.

⁸ *Outl. of Met.*, § 10; *Mikr.*, 3: p. 465 *seq.*

⁹ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 524; *Met.*, § 82.

In other words, action implies passion, feeling. Interaction has no meaning when applied to unconscious existence ; it is only the being that feels that can receive impressions and react upon them.¹ In order to make intelligible the notion of the interaction of things, therefore, as well as their being and their unity, we are forced to assign to the 'thing' a spiritual nature.²

What shall we say as to the cogency of this metaphysical argument? That it is not convincing must, I think, be generally granted. Lotze's analysis of the thing is not without value, certainly ; but the step by which he passes from the necessary unity of things to their spirituality is quite unwarrantable. By what right do we make the anthropomorphic assumption, that the reality outside us can exist only in the same form as that which we have learned through inner experience to know as the peculiarity of our own conscious spiritual nature?³ Lotze in a measure forestalls this objection,⁴ maintaining that while anything that really exists may have its own mode of existence, yet we may not assume an unknown object of such a kind as would without reason conflict with the inferences we cannot avoid. The conception of the thing as commonly held is not of such value, he implies, that we need to maintain it at the cost of an appeal to a wholly unknown possibility. Moreover, if "such peculiarity of existence is asserted, the further predicates assigned to it must correspond" ; but Lotze believes that he has shown conclusively that unity and interaction, two concepts which we find ourselves obliged to attach to things, are inconsistent with any other form of existence than spirit. It is surely pertinent to reply that the thing is not unknown ; that, in so far as we know it, it does present itself as a unity, and as sustaining reciprocal relations with other things, but, on the other hand, that it never gives the least evidence of possessing psychical life. The burden of proof must rest with him who asserts that things are spirits, and Lotze cannot be said to have proved his case.

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 525 ; Cf. *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 26, 83-84.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 547-548.

³ Cf. Hartmann : *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 55.

⁴ *Met.*, § 98.

It is, perhaps, not without significance that Lotze finds himself obliged somewhat to modify his own conception in the course of his argument. His argument for the spirituality of all being hinges upon the fact that the thing must be conceived as the subject of changing states. Yet once, at least, he explicitly rejects this statement as inaccurate and misleading, and substitutes another which puts the matter in quite a different light. Instead of conceiving α as the subject of the states α , β , γ , through which it passes, he substitutes as a more exact statement that α , "while it is continuously changing, remains always within a 'closed series' of forms, every one of which can be transformed by means of definite conditions into every other, and no one of which can be transformed by means of any condition into any form foreign to this entire series."¹ Had Lotze held fast to this formulation, he would have found the transition to psychical life more difficult. The unity of the thing, as thus expressed, is by no means analogous to the unity of consciousness.

Nor should we forget that to appeal to our inner experience of unity in change, is not to adduce an explanation of this experience. In some manner inexplicable to us, we know that the manifold streams of our psychical life flow together in the unity of the self; but the unity of consciousness is far too involved in mystery to warrant our using it as a principle of explanation which may be applied to other phenomena. Moreover, this unity of our conscious life involves self-consciousness, which can not be predicated even of animals, to say nothing of things commonly termed inanimate. How far the animal may be a psychical unity we have small means of ascertaining. If unity depends on consciousness, it may well be questioned whether so low a grade of mentality as must be possessed by 'things,' if they possess mentality at all, could give the unity required by Lotze for the reality of the thing.

However convincing to Lotze's own mind these metaphysical considerations may have been, I cannot but think that the ethical argument constrained him to the belief that things are spiritual. Selfless things can have no value, no meaning for themselves.

¹ *Outl. of Met.*, § 36.

Only that can have value which never merely *is*, but is *for itself* (*für sich ist*), that is, knows, feels, enjoys, or possesses itself; and only spirit can meet this requirement.¹ Lotze's poetical imagination pictures a universe pulsing with joy throughout the whole range of being, each element contributing its own tone to swell the harmonious symphony which is the joy of the Infinite, to whom alone belongs full consciousness of self and of the whole. No part of the cosmos is blind and lifeless; the glow of feeling and enjoyment pervades all. "All pressure and tension undergone by matter, the rest of stable equilibrium, and the rending asunder of former connections, all this not only takes place, but also in taking place gives rise to some enjoyment."² It is to Lotze an incredible and revolting thought that 'things' exist merely to minister to souls; that one half of creation "has no function whatever save that of serving the other half."³ Why should there be, he asks, a world of things which themselves gain nothing by existing, but "would only serve as a system of occasions or means for producing in spiritual subjects representations which after all would have no likeness to their productive causes? Could not the creative power dispense with this round-about way, and give rise directly in spirits to the phenomena which it was intended to present to them? Could it not present that form of a world which was to be seen without the intervention of an unseen world which could never be seen as it would be if unseen?"⁴ Here, as in some other passages, Lotze seems haunted by the spectre of a Kantian world of things-in-themselves, alien and impenetrable to the perceiving mind. The alternative suggested—the explanation of phenomena given by subjective Idealism—Lotze elsewhere rejects as "an unconditional renunciation of all pretensions to knowledge."⁵

Objective Idealism, likewise, while it avoids the error of the former view, yet fails, according to Lotze, to give a satisfactory solution of the problem. By making things immanent in the Ab-

¹ Cf. *Outl. of Met.*, § 3.

² *Mikr.*, I : p. 406; Cf. pp. 405, 408, 445.

³ *Mikr.*, I : pp. 397-398.

⁴ *Met.*, § 97; cf. also 98.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 526; Cf. *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 78-83.

solute, in the sense that they are mere states or actions of the Absolute, without 'being-for-self,' it denies to them any true reality and grants them an apparent existence only.¹ Lotze's chief criticism of Idealism in this connection, is not that it denies objectivity or externality to things, but that nothing is gained for selfless things by such externality.² Idealism presents us, indeed, with an ordered world of things, objective for our cognition, but having only apparent reality because having no existence for self. Why not, Lotze asks, transform the assertion that only minds are real, into the assertion that all that is real is mind?³ To be real is to exist for self; but existence for self can be predicated only of the being that feels its own states, is the unitary subject of its states, and by just this which is its very essence, detaches itself in some measure from the Infinite. Hence 'realness,' 'real existence,' belongs to spiritual beings only, and to them in differing degrees. It reaches its highest stage in the self-conscious being that knows itself as an Ego, but "is not absent in the being which, though far removed from the clearness of such self-consciousness, yet in some duller form of feeling exists for itself and enjoys its existence."⁴

In the end, however, Lotze seems to deny to things the reality which he claims for them. There is an immense difference between the human spirit and the mere 'thing,' as to the degree to which each is able to 'detach itself from the Infinite.' Lotze finally declares that the true reality is conscious, personal spirit, "the living, personal spirit of God and the world of personal spirits which He has created."⁵ Again, Lotze states that "'real beings' are those of his actions that the Infinite permanently maintains as centers of out- and in-going effects that are susceptible of acting and of being affected; their reality consists . . . in this, that they as spiritual elements have *being for self*. This 'being for self' is the essential factor in that which we . . . designate as 'being outside the Infinite.' On the contrary, what we are accustomed to call 'things' and 'events between things,' is the sum of those

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 532-537.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 536.

² *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 534.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 623.

³ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 531.

other actions which the Highest Principle variously executes in all spirits so uniformly and in such coherency according to law, that to these spirits there must appear to be one world of substantial and efficient 'things,' existing in space outside themselves."¹ This is one of those perplexing statements by which Lotze not infrequently makes equivocal his position in the controversy between Realism and Idealism. It is quoted here to show that in this one passage, at least, he seems to affirm 'being-for-self' only of self-conscious spirits, and to assert that the sole function of 'things' is to produce in these spirits the appearance of an ordered universe.

It is obviously the ethical concept of value that determines Lotze to attribute a psychical life to things. Everything must have value, and not alone for other beings, but a value for self. Value is apprehended in feeling; hence things must feel, and enjoy their own existence. Von Hartmann pronounces Lotze's assertion that reality is 'being-for-self' quite arbitrary and unwarrantable;² but it is wholly in accord with the general idealistic conviction, surely, to maintain that in the highest and truest sense of the term, that only is *real* which is *for itself*, which has the power to set before it definite ends, and to realize itself in action. The truth of this view does not, however, carry with it the necessity of attributing a psychical life to things. Other alternatives are possible and preferable. We have seen that Lotze finds himself obliged to deny reality in the true sense of the term to things, even after he has endowed them with psychical life. Much more than mere feeling is essential for the existence of that 'being-for-self' which is synonymous with true reality. What value there can be in mere sentient feeling, and that the lowest and most confused possible, is by no means clear. The possibility of suffering, to which all sentient life is liable, does not seem to suggest itself to Lotze as a possible complication of the problem.

The doctrine that things are spirits is clearly rooted in the ethical presuppositions of Lotze's philosophy, though supported by metaphysical arguments as well. It is, perhaps, the least tenable of his characteristic doctrines, and one that many sympathetic readers would be glad to see eliminated from his system.

¹ *Outl. of Met.*, § 94; cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 530.

² Von Hartmann: *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 62; cf. pp. 74-76.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCEPTION OF GOD: GOD AS THE WORLD-GROUND, AND AS INFINITE PERSONALITY.

THE notion of the Absolute must hold a place of chief importance in any comprehensive philosophical system. Lotze's conception of the Absolute, however, has a two-fold significance due to the two-fold object of his inquiry. The unity of all finite things in the World-Ground is the central doctrine of his metaphysics. From the metaphysical point of view it is complete in itself, it need appeal to no external source for the guarantee of its validity. But the metaphysical inquiry is never, with Lotze, the sole nor the chief aim. The world is predominantly ethical. More fundamental even than the primary facts of existence and the truths expressed in the universal law, is the reality of ethical values. The Absolute must for Lotze meet the requirements of a universe which, with all its diversity, is ethical to the core. It must be the ground of the real world and of the ethical meaning of that world. Impelled by this two-fold requirement, Lotze conceives the Infinite Being as the World-Ground and as complete Personality. When we have considered these two aspects of the Absolute separately, we may very properly ask whether Lotze has succeeded in uniting them in one Being, or whether, indeed, such a synthesis is possible. At present we will turn to the argument by which the unity of the metaphysical World-Ground is established.

The fact of change, or 'becoming,' must be regarded as fundamental. The 'thing,' as we have found, resolves itself into a spiritual being, the very essence of which is activity within fixed limits and in a definite manner which may be termed its law.¹ The concept of change is then unavoidable. But this concept is furthermore found to imply the union of the members

¹ *Met.*, Ch. III.

of the series in the relation of antecedent and consequent. The order of nature can not be conceived as a mere sequence; the attempt to conceive it thus involves reason in serious difficulties and inconsistencies.¹ The concept of change must be supplemented by the concept of cause.

The next step is to show that the effect *c*, following from the action of *a* upon *b*, depends quite as much upon the nature of *b* as upon the nature and agency of *a*; that is, causation implies reciprocal action. We have seen in the course of the discussion of mechanism that no element can be conceived as merely passive.² Nothing takes to itself any ready-made state merely as an accession to its own nature. On the contrary, everything responds according to its nature to every external stimulus. For example, a blow of exactly the same force produces very different effects upon different bodies: one it shivers into fragments; one it sets into rhythmic vibrations; in one it causes merely change of shape, and in another, violent explosion.³ Not only, however, does the action of *a* differ according as it is exerted upon *b*, *c*, or *d*, but in order that *a* may have an effect upon *b* at all, it must be induced to exercise this effect by being itself subject to an effect from *b*. The same is true of the causal action of *b* upon *a*, and so on *ad infinitum*. The reciprocal causation of all things must be regarded as "an eternal, uninterrupted matter of fact."⁴ None but an artificial view has attempted to deny the reciprocal action of things. Natural science is constrained to recognize it.⁵ The question is, how are we to apprehend it? Immanent action—the development of state out of state within one and the same being—is ordinarily assumed as a matter of fact that requires no further effort of thought. It is really quite as inexplicable, however, as the action of one thing upon another.⁶

Lotze next proceeds to show that reciprocal action is impos-

¹ *Met.* § 43; *Outl. of Met.*, §§ 34, 35, 38.

² *Met.*, § 50.

³ *Outl. of Met.*, § 57.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, § 47. Cf. § 39. *Met.* § 45.

⁵ *Met.*, §§ 44, 51.

⁶ *Met.*, §§ 46-68.

ible between independent and self-subsisting beings. Hence, he argues, since causation in the form of interaction can not be denied, things are *not*, as they appear to be, independent, but rather are parts of and immanent in one Being, which is the World-Ground. This conclusion is reached negatively, by showing the inconceivability of any form of 'transeunt' action between two things regarded as independent. Cause cannot be conceived as taking place *between* things. It is commonly sought to explain the causal action of things as a transfer of an influence, a force, action, or state, *e*, from *a* to *b*. The difficulties inherent in such a view become apparent as soon as we examine it closely. Why should *a* give off *e*? Why does *e* take the direction *a-b* rather than *a-c*, or any other? How are we to think *e* in the interval, during its passage? Why, once the movement is initiated, should *e* stop at *b* and become a state of the latter? The attempt to answer these queries makes it clear that the proposed explanation of causal action between two things as the passing over of an influence or force from one to the other, in truth assumes cause by assuming that *a* in some way initiates the movement and gives it the direction *a-b*, and that *b* receives and in some way takes unto itself the hypothetical traveller. "What we call such a transfer is nothing but a designation of that which has taken place in the still unexplained process of causation, or which may be regarded as its result."¹

If things are still to be conceived as independent, since 'transeunt' action is impossible, but two alternatives remain, those of 'Occasionalism,' and of a 'Preëstablished Harmony.' The former is dismissed by Lotze with the minimum of consideration which it deserves. At best it can not be accepted as a metaphysical theory; it substitutes for explanation an arbitrary assumption.² The theory of a predetermined harmony of cosmic order, as held by Leibniz, receives from Lotze somewhat prolonged discussion.³ According to this theory the states of the different things accompany and correspond to one another, without having to be produced by reciprocal action. From a metaphys-

¹ *Met.*, § 56. Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 484; *Outl. of Met.*, § 42.

² *Met.*, § 61.

³ *Met.*, §§ 63-67.

ical point of view Lotze objects to this on the ground that it also fails to explain the course of the world.¹ The problem is but referred back to an unintelligible preëstablishment of the world-order. Moreover, the Leibnizian world lacks unity; it is not a cosmos at all, but an aggregation of discrete and independent units, an infinity of worlds, indeed, corresponding to one another, but in no wise interrelated.²

There is but one resource left us,—to deny the independent existence of things, and to maintain that all elements are parts of a single real Being. Thus, so-called *transeunt* action becomes *immanent* action. Pluralism gives place to Monism. A first suggestion of the impossibility of Pluralism is afforded as soon as we recognize that the elements of the world are so related as to be comparable; but this rendered their origin or immanence in one Being probable, merely, not necessary. It is not till we search into the meaning of what we term cause and effect that the monistic view becomes a necessity for thought.³ If “causal action is to appear *possible*, this assumption of the independence of ‘things’ toward one another must be denied absolutely. A state which takes place in the element *a*, must for the very reason that it is in *a*, likewise *be* an affection of *b*. . . . The foregoing requirement can be met only by the assumption that all individual things are substantially one: that is to say, they do not merely become combined subsequently by all manner of relations, each individual having previously been present as an independent existence; but from the very beginning onward there are only different modifications of one individual Being which we propose to designate provisionally by the title of the Infinite, of the Absolute = *M*.”⁴ Any change in *a* is at once, “without having to wait to become so,” a change of *M*. So, also, this change in *M* “does not need to travel” to make its sign in *b*, it is already a change in *b* by virtue of the immanence of both *a* and *b* in *M*.⁵ *M* main-

¹ *Met.*, 66; cf. § 67, *Mikr.*, 3: p. 485.

² *Met.*, § 79.

³ *Met.*, § 69; *Philos. of Relig.* §§ 17-18.

⁴ *Outl. of Met.*, § 48.

⁵ Von Hartmann's objection that Lotze here introduces two puzzles instead of one, viz., that in place of the effect of *a* upon *b*, we have the effect of *a* upon the Absolute,

tains its identity with itself, and does not admit of a change in a without restoring the same nature M by the production of a compensatory change in b . The procedure which we conceive as the action of a upon b , is in truth the action of M upon itself.¹

The world must then be regarded as immanent in one Absolute Being, in which all finite things live, and move, and have their finite being. It is not the conception of an immanent God, but of an immanent world. Indeed, we have no right as yet to apply the name God, with its religious implications, to the World-Ground. The question as to how we are to conceive of the Absolute in itself and in its relation to finite things, is not very satisfactorily answered by Lotze. At least, it may be said that the difficulties that arise are not peculiar to his system. In a certain sense, Lotze says, all monistic systems amount merely to negation. That is, "they all deny the independent reality of finite things, but they can not determine positively the nature of the bond which unites them."² The relation of the One to the Many does not admit of determination in any positive way.² Every individual thing exists in virtue not of any being of its own, but of the commission given it by the Absolute. It is what M charges it to be, and exists just so long as its particular being is required for the equation $M = M$. The mode and amount of its so-called operation upon other things is prescribed for it at each moment by M , for the re-establishment of the equation referred to.⁴ Only in so far as something has 'being-for-self,' is an object to itself, distinguishes itself from something else,—only in so far does it, by this very act, 'detach itself from the Infinite.' As we have seen, only spiritual beings can do this. Strictly speaking, only that being which can feel and assert itself *as a self* is so detached from the universal, all-comprehensive basis of being as to admit of being described as *outside* it; whatever has not

and of the Absolute upon b , seems to miss the mark. This very objection is rightly urged by Lotze himself against the conception of Leibniz. See von Hartmann: *Lotze's Philosophie*, p. 87; cf. *Mikr.* 3: p. 485.

¹Cf. *Met.*, § 70; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 19; *Outl. of Met.*, § 48; *Mikr.*, 3: p. 486.

²*Met.*, § 73.

³*Met.*, § 74.

⁴*Met.*, § 85.

this capability will always be included as 'immanent' within it.¹

As to the positive nature of the World-Ground, so far we seem warranted only in describing it as infinite activity, a constant becoming. It is an eternally present condition of action. It can not be conceived as ever really existing in the general form indicated by the sign M . It really exists at each moment only as a case, having a definite value, of the equation expressed by the formula $M = \varphi(ab \dots r)$, which formula indicates that a certain definite connection of the elements of the world, φ , exhibits, at this moment, the whole nature of M .² In this form it is at the same time "the efficient cause of the actuality of the state next-ensuing, as well as the conditioning ground of what this state contains."³ Thus the unity of M is conceived as active, dynamic. If a sensible image is needed, such is furnished, Lotze says, by the many simultaneous parts of a piece of polyphonic music; each compels all the rest to vary in harmony with itself and all the others, forming a series of movements that result in the unity of a melody which is consistent and complete in itself.⁴ Again, Lotze conceives the Absolute Being as the unity of a *living idea*, "the import of which . . . is no mere aggregate of ideas, but a self-articulated whole of variously interwoven parts; each one of these parts, as well as the several elements which comprise it, acquiring a determinate quantity according to its value and position in the whole."⁵

Lotze constantly guards himself against the misapprehension that he assigns a definite, positive meaning to the terms by which he designates the Absolute and seeks to express its relation to finite being. Thus he says the elasticity or self-maintenance that we ascribe to the Absolute is not a conception to which a definite meaning can be attached. It is used merely "as a not unimag-

¹ *Met.*, § 98. Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, § 41.

² *Met.*, § 70, 79, 82.

³ *Met.*, § 82.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Met.*, § 195. By this statement, and others similar to it, Lotze approaches the Hegelian conception, and suggests that his own metaphysical view is in truth far less opposed to that of Hegel than he deems it to be. See also Wm. Wallace: *Lectures and Essays*, pp. 482, 510.

inable expression to which different significations may be given." Least of all does he wish to represent the reactions of the Absolute in a merely mechanical way, as directed to the preservation of the *status quo*; instead, "we might assume even an impulse of development in progress towards a definite goal." ¹

We have now before us, in somewhat meager outline, the argument by which Lotze seeks to establish the unity of things in the World-Ground. In criticising it we should be careful, I think, to distinguish those difficulties which pertain to Lotze's own doctrine, from those which are common to all monistic systems. Every monism is open to the charge, on the one hand, that the Absolute is but the aggregation of its finite parts, and, on the other, that the finite is engulfed and lost in the Absolute, that 'lion's lair' which many footsteps enter, but from which none emerge. It may be, indeed, that this difficulty is enhanced in both its aspects in the philosophy of Lotze, because of his insistence on the personality of both the Infinite and of the finite, yet at bottom it is the old problem and is in no wise peculiar to Lotze's monism. It is the writer's intention to confine the discussion, so far as is possible, to that which is distinctive of the view we are considering.

Much of the criticism of Lotze seems somewhat captious. The writer, at least, is unable to agree with those who pronounce his metaphysics quite arbitrary, and lacking in critical acumen and logical consistency.² Every metaphysics must be in so far arbitrary that it must have some starting point and in its development imply certain definite conceptions. Few thinkers have reached their conclusions by more cautious reasoning than Lotze. His analysis of cause as a determination by reciprocal action is one of the most valuable of his positive contributions to metaphysical thought, and is a most conclusive argument against empiricism which substitutes a mere sequence for causal connection.

Let us see, however, in just how far Lotze's monism affords an explanation of the connection of things. With the single ex-

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 20.

² See Lange's *History of Materialism*, tr. by Thomas, II, 285; F. C. S. Schiller: "Lotze's Monism," *Philos. Rev.*, 1896, pp. 225 ff.

ception that the Unitary Being is to be conceived as active, its nature is undetermined. The designation of *M* as a unity, Lotze expressly states, contains no explanation whatever of the precise sort of unity which obtains; it has rather the distinct negative meaning which denies the self-dependence of individual things. No definite meaning can be attached to that action of the Absolute upon itself which appears to us as the reciprocal action of things. The use of the terms 'reciprocal action' and 'interaction,' indeed, becomes misleading.¹

The proof by which the unity of things is established is a negative one, resting upon the disproof of the possibility of reciprocal action between things wholly independent and unrelated. The immanent action which is substituted for 'transeunt' action is, however, quite as incomprehensible as the latter. Early in his discussion Lotze points out that the connection of states *within* one and the same being is really no better understood than the relation of cause and effect *between* two beings, though ordinarily assumed as needing no explanation.² So at the end, when all action is shown to be immanent action, the real nature of this immanent action of the Absolute, *M*, is quite inexplicable. How *M* initiates action, how a state or affection of *a* is at once an affection of *b*, but not of *c*,—these questions are unanswerable. In substituting immanent action for 'transeunt' action, we have then gained by so much, namely, for an hypothesis which is self-contradictory, and therefore unthinkable, we have substituted an hypothesis which is inexplicable, but not unthinkable. Lotze's monism is in a general sense, at least, intelligible. If we are dissatisfied, and think that it stops short of a final explanation, we may do well to ponder Lotze's words, so often repeated, that we cannot expect to learn 'how the world is made.' The world *is*, and is constituted in a particular way. To ask *how* causal action is produced, is as futile as to ask why

¹ One critic goes so far as to say that Lotze has not only stripped the term reciprocal action of all meaning, but has come perilously near destroying the notion of connection according to law, and substituting therefor a lawless mutability of the Absolute. See Krestoff: *Lotze's metaphysischer Seelenbegriff*, pp. 77-78.

² *Met.*, §§ 46, 68.

there is a world at all, why its content is *M*, and why the action of *M* is as it is.¹

We would seem to be warranted in the conclusion that Lotze has succeeded in proving the necessary unity of things. He has done this by a method of exclusion, rejecting one hypothesis after another as inadequate, until at length the sole remaining alternative is that of unity. "It was not necessary," he says, "that the unity of all individual beings should be conjectured or discovered as an hypothesis enabling us to set aside difficulties that are in our way. It is, it seems to me, a thought which by mere analysis can be shown to be involved in the conception of reciprocal action."² Lotze has, I think, proved conclusively the impossibility of interaction between unrelated and wholly independent beings. This certainly implies the connection of things in a system, which in turn implies some kind of a unity. The nature of this unity the metaphysical argument so far traced leaves indefinite, to be discovered only by further investigation.

Having shown that cosmological speculation leads inevitably to the positing of one Infinite Being as the Ground of all that is, Lotze proceeds to identify this Absolute with the religious conception of God, and to attribute to this Being absolute goodness and complete personality. In doing this, Lotze has left himself open to the criticism that he has spanned by a single bold leap the gulf between the metaphysical Absolute and the personal God. An Absolute is not a God, it may be said, and to identify the two summarily is not to solve the problem of their unity in one Being. While feeling the force of this criticism, the writer believes that the transition is really not so abrupt as it seems. It is true that in the *Mikrokosmos* Lotze begins his discussion of the personality of God by stating that he will now turn to the development of the idea of the Infinite as contained already in religious thought, that he will take as the object of reflection, "not the metaphysical postulate of the Infinite, but instead of it the full and complete concept of the God who is to realize this pos-

¹ Cf. *Met.*, § 83; *Outl. of Met.*, § 48.

² *Met.*, § 71; cf. § 69.

tulate.”¹ Notwithstanding this and other similar statements, the writer feels it necessary to take exception to the assertion that Lotze makes no attempt to show that the Unity of Things, as discovered by metaphysics, must be susceptible of religious predicates.² The *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion*, brief and condensed as it is, shows a very evident, and, in good measure, a successful attempt to unite the metaphysical and religious concepts in one, not by merely bringing them together, but by showing that our concept of the Infinite is manifestly incomplete when lacking either the metaphysical or the ethical attributes. This view of the matter, if the true one, will appear more clearly as we follow Lotze’s development of his doctrine.

As we have already seen, the argument based on the fact of the reciprocal action of things warrants only the assumption of the necessary unity of the Absolute. What this Absolute is, is left for further determination. The conception of the Infinite so far made use of “merely designates a postulate in a provisional way . . . how we are to conceive of this Infinite itself . . . is reserved for subsequent investigation.”³ The *Philosophy of Religion*, in seeking further to ascertain the nature of the Supreme Being, starts out from this datum derived from metaphysics.⁴ The time-honored ‘proofs’ of the existence of God, Lotze finds as destitute of demonstrative force as did Kant before him.⁵ They fail severally to establish that which they attempt, and together they fail to bring us to the personality of the Infinite. As the teleological argument had for Kant a peculiar attraction, so the ontological argument appeals to Lotze as rich in significance, though falling short of demonstration.⁶ Since these arguments fail us, says Lotze, “we will find our point of departure in a simpler datum,” and “attempt to deduce from it, not exactly the existence of God, but a more modest conclusion, which shall serve us as a preliminary condition for that other conclusion.”⁷

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 549.

² F. C. S. Schiller : “Lotze’s Monism,” *Philos. Rev.*, 1896, pp. 237-238.

³ *Outl. of Met.*, § 48 ; cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, § 20.

⁴ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 19.

⁵ *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 6-14 ; *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 554-562.

⁶ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 6 ; *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 561.

⁷ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 16.

This datum is in substance the assumption that all the elements of the world act upon one another, each exerting influence upon the rest, and in turn receiving influence from all. This leads us to the conclusion of the metaphysics, that is, the necessary assumption of a Unit Being, or World-Ground.

In seeking 'more precise determinations of the Absolute,' we are met first by the query whether the Absolute is to be conceived as Matter or as Spirit.¹ That the latter is the true alternative is decided by Lotze on the ground that a spiritual principle is necessary in order to spiritual processes. Psychology compels us to the conviction that states of motion are the occasions upon which there arise in us spiritual processes, such as sensations and affections. But it is impossible to say that these states of motion ever transmute themselves into sensations and affections. So far as our knowledge goes, from physical processes only physical processes can originate. Physical and psychical processes are disparate.² For Lotze's own metaphysical theory this argument has a wider significance even than the foregoing, since the world is conceived by him as spiritual throughout, and certainly a material principle—if such were conceivable from his point of view—"would be in no condition to produce from itself the world of spiritual processes."³

There are "two distinct series of attributes through which man tries to comprehend the being of God. . . . Metaphysical attributes of Unity, Eternity, Omnipresence, and Omnipotence, determine Him as the ground of all finite reality; ethical attributes of Wisdom, Justice, and Holiness satisfy our longing to find in that which has supreme reality, supreme worth also."⁴ Thus, man seeks "to blend the Existent and the Worthy into the notion of the living God."⁵ At this point in the *Mikrokosmos*, Lotze regards the notion of a Personal God as a goal

¹ See *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 21-26.

² *Philos. of Relig.*, § 22.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 563; *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 27-31. In the *Philos. of Relig.*, the predicate of Unchangeableness is added to the above list of metaphysical attributes. Eternity and Unchangeableness seem, however, to reduce to the same conception. See §§ 28-31.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 562.

already reached, and goes on to defend this against doubts as to its possibility. In the *Philosophy of Religion*, however, he supplies an immediate link which goes far to refute those who maintain that the transition from the metaphysical to the religious conception of the Infinite is quite arbitrary and abrupt. There he states that "if the predicates of 'unconditionateness' [that is, the metaphysical predicates] are to be valid for the Highest Being, then one condition of this validity lies precisely in the addition of a last formal predicate, namely, that of Personal Existence."¹ It is to be regretted that Lotze did not further develop this thought; it seems very probable that he would have done so had the work upon which he was engaged at the time of his death been brought to completion. When we remember that he regarded unity as conditioned by spiritual existence, and being-for-self as the essence of reality, that thing being in the highest degree *real* which possesses such being-for-self in the fullest measure, we have some suggestions at least as to the direction his development of this idea would take.

Lotze considers briefly certain attempts which have been made to frame a concept of an impersonal Infinite, all of which he believes have failed. He recalls with what noble motives and moral earnestness Fichte opposed a crude anthropomorphism, and sought to dissolve the notion of God in that of a moral World-Order. Yet Fichte was wrong. When thought out, the idea of a World-Order resolves itself into that of a Being that orders. No order is separable from the ordered material in which it is realized; the order must ever be a relation of something which exists. Our search is for a Real Being—the ground of all reality—not a relation. "Hence it is nothing but *order*, as its name says, it is never *that which orders*, which is what we seek, and which the ordinary notion of God (however inadequate in other respects) determined rightly at any rate in this."²

Against the notion of the Absolute as self-developing Idea, Lotze urges strenuous objections. We have had occasion frequently to notice his antagonism to Hegel. On this point he believes that the Hegelian concept of the Absolute excludes personality. The

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 33.

² *Mikr.*, 3: p. 565; cf. 567–68; See Lohan: *Die Gottesidee Lotzes*, p. 22.

truth of this interpretation need not concern us ; it is one which meets both support and dissent from numerous critics and champions of Hegelianism. As we have seen, to make an Idea supreme seemed to Lotze to deify thought and to ignore value. He further urges an objection similar to that brought against a World-Order as the ultimate reality : An Idea "is and remains nothing more than the statement of a thought-formula by which we fix, as an aid to reflection, the inner connection between the living activities of the Real."¹ That is, it signifies a *relation*, merely ; it does not give us Reality. Like the notion of a World-Order, the Idea has no content ; it is not reality, and it lacks dynamic power to produce reality.

There are three distinct lines of argument by which Lotze seeks positively to establish the personality of God. The Infinite must be a person in order to be the ground of finite personality ; the source and ground of the moral order and moral ideals must be sought in a personality ; and, finally, reality can be predicated only of that which exists as personality. These are all suggested rather than fully and clearly developed, however. Only the last is in any sense peculiar to Lotze's view, and this follows directly from his metaphysics.

Throughout his works Lotze emphasizes the value and dignity of the individual personality. The human spirit can not be regarded as wholly dependent on the course of nature, a mere product of nature which transiently appears and then vanishes, as a thing of no intrinsic worth. The history of mankind, a history of struggle and achievement, of progress from the low and brutish to ever-increasing fullness of spiritual life, constrains us to reverence the human nature that is ours, and to believe in its high calling. That distinguishing endowment of the human mind—the "capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite"²—would seem to imply that its source and its object are to be found in something akin to the human mind itself. Is it not far from probable that "the Absolute, of itself unconscious and impersonal, produces even in its blind development the favoring

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 574.

² *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 341-342.

conditions under which its own products, the finite spirits, developed the personality denied to itself?"¹ Indeed, Lotze boldly asserts that the burden of proof must rest with those who deny, rather than with those who affirm, the personality of the Infinite.

But, furthermore, we find ourselves under the necessity of making intelligible from a single real principle the moral order of the world and the fact that it furnishes us with obligatory ideals of the Good.² Quoting the words of Fichte, Lotze says: "It is not doubtful, 'but most certain and indeed the ground of all other certainty, that there is this moral order of the world, that for every intelligent creature there is an appointed place and a work which he is expected to perform, and that every circumstance of his lot is part of a plan, in independence of which not a hair of his head can be harmed . . . that every good action will succeed and every evil action certainly fail, and that to those who do but truly love that which is good all things shall work together for good.'"³ But if the notion of any active order necessarily and inevitably leads back to that of an Ordering Being, the notion of a moral order leads further. Only a conscious and moral Being can impart to the cosmic course the impulses by which is established the thorough-going dominion of what is good.⁴ If we regard the cosmos as moral, as we seem forced to do, then "Personality is the only conceivable form of its Supreme Cause."⁵

We have said that the third argument, namely, that personality is the only Real, is the only one that is peculiar to Lotze's view, and that is directly connected with his metaphysical doctrine. Spiritual life, as we have seen, is for him the only form of real existence. The unity of that which we call a 'thing,' its coherency according to law, would be impossible, save as pertaining to a spiritual subject. But the essence of spiritual life is 'being-for-self'; real existence then is that only which has worth in and for itself. But while all reality is such by virtue of 'being-for-self,' different

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 26.

² *Philos. of Relig.*, § 26.

³ Fichte: *Sämmtliche Werke*, V, p. 188. Cf. also *Mikr.*, 3: p. 566.

⁴ Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 567.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 568.

forms of reality possess this attribute in different degrees. Only that being which apprehends itself as a self or ego is truly real, and the Supreme Reality must possess in the highest possible degree the 'Being-for-self' which is synonymous with Reality. Finite spirits share the reality of the Infinite, but the Infinite alone is truly Real and truly an Ego.¹ The highest form of 'being-for-self' that we know is personality; ought we not, therefore, to attribute the same to the Absolute Real in the highest and, indeed, the only perfect degree?

Certain considerations have, however, led to an unwillingness on the part of many thinkers to attribute personality to the Infinite. It has, indeed, "become almost an axiom that personality is a category of finite being only."² This view is based upon certain conceptions as to the necessary relation of the Ego and Non-Ego. An Ego is not thinkable, its advocates affirm, except in contrast with a Non-Ego; hence, to assert personal existence of God is to limit his Being, to condition Him by something not Himself.³ The foregoing proposition, says Lotze, is susceptible of three interpretations. The first two of these seem to run together, however, and we may consider them as one. The first interpretation, therefore, is this: The Ego has significance only as contrasted with the Non-Ego, and can be experienced only in such contrast.⁴ To this Lotze makes answer that Ego and Non-Ego are not merely two correlative terms, having no meaning apart from each other. Each can not owe its whole content to the other, else both would remain without content. One of the two must be independently determined. By the usage of language the Ego alone has its own independent name; the Non-Ego is only the negative determination which excludes the Ego without indicating any positive content of its own. But quite apart from what is implied in language, the Ego is the positive, referring to the immediate self-feeling "by which the Ego positively apprehends what belongs to it as *its own*, and on the other hand, at first excludes from itself in a merely negative way what

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 623, also pp. 615-619.

² Pfleiderer: *Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung*, p. 59; cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 564.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 509.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 570.

does not belong to it.”¹ The primary basis of personality is in immediate self-existence, and herein alone do we find the basis of the possibility of the contrast of Ego and Non-Ego.² We have already seen in another connection that Lotze makes feeling the basis of self-consciousness. Referring to this, he says that “this discussion showed us that all self-consciousness rests upon the foundation of the direct sense of self, which can by no means arise from becoming aware of a contrast with the external world, but is itself the reason that this contrast can be felt as unique, as not comparable to any other distinction between two objects.”³

It is the second interpretation, however, which posits the weightiest objection to belief in a Personal God. This may be stated as follows: The Ego is conditioned by the existence and active influence of a Non-Ego; personality can not be produced even in a being whose nature is capable of it without the coöperative and educative influences of an external world.⁴ Personality is unthinkable, therefore, as an attribute of the Infinite; it has meaning only when ascribed to finite beings. Stimulus from the external world, through the avenues of the senses, must awaken the mind to activity, and develop personality, or self-existence, which is otherwise only potential.

But while it is true that the incitements to its action come to it from without, even the finite being is in part self-conditioned; the forms of its activity proceed from its own inner nature, and “neither the content of its sensations nor its feelings, nor the peculiarity of any other of its manifestations, is given to it from without.”⁵ But if finite personality can not be regarded as wholly determined by incitements from a source external to itself, to a much greater degree is it absurd to assume that personality as attributed to the Infinite Being implies such determination. The transference of the conditions of finite personality to the Infinite is quite without justification. Such transference assumes that what is true of the finite must necessarily hold of the In-

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 38; Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 570.

² *Mikr.*, 3: pp. 571, 579-580.

³ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 571.

⁴ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 573.

⁵ *Mikr.*, 3: p. 575.

ite ; it ignores the distinction which we invariably make in every other case between the finite and the Absolute, the conditioned and the Unconditioned. The finite being requires the Non-Ego, not because it needs the contrast with something alien, but because it does not contain within itself the conditions of its own existence. The Infinite comprehends within itself all that is finite, and is the cause of its nature and reality. It does not need that its activity "should be called forth by external stimuli, but from the beginning its concept is without that deficiency which seems to us to make such stimuli necessary for the finite being, and its active efficiency thinkable."¹ The Infinite Being is wholly self-sufficing, and possesses within itself the conditions of its own development. "That which is only approximately possible for the finite, the conditioning of its life by itself, takes place without limit in God, and no contrast of the external world is necessary for Him."² To conceive of the Absolute as thus the ground of spiritual and self-conscious activities, is to make no greater demand upon the imagination than is made by every materialistic or pantheistic view, or even by any physical explanation of the world.³

There follows from the preceding argument a conclusion which is the exact opposite of the usual one: "*Perfect* personality is reconcilable only with the conception of an Infinite Being ; for finite beings only an approximation to this is attainable."⁴ The finite mind is a constituent of a whole ; it has a definite place in the cosmos, and is, therefore, subject to limitations. Not only must its activities be awakened by successive stimuli, so that the whole self can never be brought together at one moment of time, but also its inner life follows the laws of a psychical mechanism in accordance with which its activities are inevitably exercised. The finite being never knows itself as a comprehensible unity, neither at any moment of time nor in a retrospect which includes the entire temporal course of its life. It approximates, but never quite attains, the ideal unity which it posits as its self. There is

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 575.

² *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 576. Cf. 3 : p. 580 ; *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 39-40.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 577 ; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 40.

⁴ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 41. Cf. *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 580.

an obscure core of being it can never bring into complete self-consciousness. It finds the mystery within more inscrutable by far than that of the world without. In point of fact, Lotze concludes, the personality of finite beings "is an ideal, which, like all that is ideal, belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite, but . . . appertains to us only conditionally, and hence imperfectly." ¹

We have considered the two aspects under which Lotze conceives the Absolute Being,—the metaphysical Absolute, or World-Ground, and the Personal God, the concept of religion. An attempt has been made to show that he does not hold these conceptions apart or bring them together in a merely external union. On the contrary, the concept of metaphysical unity requires that this unity be conceived under the form of personality. The metaphysical inquiry, as we have seen, leads to the positing of a Unitary Being as the World-Ground. This concept is at first, however, merely negative. It gives no indication of the positive content of the World-Ground, it asserts only that the elements of the world are not to be conceived as isolated and independent. But thought cannot rest in a merely negative determination. In the effort to determine positively the nature of the ultimate reality, Lotze is forced to attribute to it a spiritual and self-conscious existence. The metaphysical concept of the unity of things is intelligible only if this unity be conceived as a spiritual and self-conscious Being. The only conceivable unity is the unity of consciousness, the only conceivable reality is the reality of self-existence. Here is the link in Lotze's argument which warrants the identification of the metaphysical Absolute with the Personal God. Whether or not we assent to the implied metaphysical doctrines which are peculiar to Lotze's view, we cannot fail to admit the force and clearness of the argument. The concept of a Personal Absolute undoubtedly does make the unity of the world more intelligible. We have in ourselves the experience of a unity which comprises all its parts, and which is something more and other than the mere sum of them all. This experience makes it possible for us in some

¹ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 579; also pp. 577-578. Cf. Royce: *The Conception of God*, pp. 272-273.

measure to conceive of the relation between the Infinite Spirit and the finite beings that constitute the world.

The metaphysical inquiry in itself, then, leads to the conclusion that the ultimate Reality must be spiritual and self-conscious, predicates which we know only in personal beings. Since personality is an ethical category, we see again, that in a very literal sense the ethical underlies the metaphysical in Lotze's philosophy. In that the Absolute is spiritual, an Ego, conscious of self and in the fullest degree self-determined, it is essentially ethical. The same conclusion is likewise reached by quite another line of argument, which follows in general the reasoning by which it is ordinarily sought to establish the personality of God. The ethical and religious consciousness ascribes to the Infinite a supreme worth and goodness, which can be realized only in a Person. This practical demand Lotze recognizes as quite as legitimate as the speculative. Both are rooted deep in human nature. The metaphysical inquiry has its source in man's apprehension of an ordered universe, the religious and ethical inquiry in his appreciation of values. The Absolute must be of such a nature as to be the ground and source of all values. Supreme Reality and supreme Worth must be united in the Highest Being. As Lotze conceives the goal of human conduct to be benevolence, so he believes the Infinite is most fitly designated as 'Living Love' that 'wills the blessedness' of all dependent beings, and by the continual outflowing of active energy sustains and fills all finite existence with its own abounding life. •

Lotze's conception of God as the true and complete personality, of which human personality is but the finite and imperfect copy, seems far more intelligible than the assertion, so often made, that the Infinite is *more* than personality, so much more that it is misleading to apply the term. This affirmation carries always the implication that the Infinite is quite *other* than personality; whereas it is surely reasonable to suppose that man—the highest thing that we know, that which the whole creation has travailed to produce and to perfect—affords the best index of the nature of the Highest Being. Man's distinguishing characteristic is Reason, self-conscious and worth-appreciative Reason. This in-

cludes, I think, all that Lotze means by personality. Reason, as we know it, is always self-conscious and worth-appreciative. In Lotze's own words, we have no right to strip from Reason the predicates we always find attached to it, and persuade ourselves that aught intelligible remains.¹ The term personality as applied to the Infinite is probably no more inadequate than any of the other terms by which we seek to designate this Being. Since we are finite beings ourselves, all the symbols that we invent must derive their meaning from what is finite, and must therefore fail signally when applied to the Infinite.²

If now the question be asked in how far Lotze's conception of the Absolute is determined by ethical and religious considerations, our answer must take cognizance of the two-fold significance of this conception. The concept of the Absolute as the World-Ground rests upon a purely speculative basis. So, at least, Lotze himself affirms in terms that admit of no ambiguity. At the close of his metaphysical discussion, he says: "Though I am old-fashioned enough not to be indifferent to the religious interests which are involved in these problems, the views for which I have been contending rest on a purely scientific basis, quite without reference to religion. No course of things, whether harmonious or discordant, seems to be conceivable except on the supposition of this unity which alone makes possible the reciprocal action of individual existences."³ This and other statements to the same effect leave no doubt as to Lotze's belief and intention that his metaphysical doctrine should rest on logical proofs.

The concept of the Absolute as Infinite Personality is reached in two ways: It is first the logical consequence and implication of Lotze's metaphysical doctrine. In order to be the World-Ground the Absolute must be a personal Being. But the personality of the Absolute is likewise necessary in order to explain the facts of the realm of values. Here moral and æsthetic ideals, the ethical presuppositions of theoretical ideals,

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 24.

² Cf. Fiske: *Through Nature to God*, pp. 157-159.

³ *Met.*, § 233; cf. § 84.

the recognition of a moral world-order, the religious aspiration for a supreme object of love and veneration—all have their place, and contribute to that practical demand for a personal God which it is the chief aim of Lotze's philosophy to justify and to establish as objectively valid.

Though prompted by different motives, the speculative and practical inquiries reach the same goal, namely, the concept of a supreme Person who is at once the ground and source of all Reality, all Truth, and all Good.

CHAPTER V.

CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE OF MAN: MAN AS A MECHANISM AND AS A PERSONALITY.

IN the introduction to the *Mikrokosmos*, we find Lotze disclaiming any attempt to set forth in a complete and comprehensive manner the system of the universe. Profoundly impressed with the limitations of human reason, he always distrusted the methods and conclusions of system-building philosophers. Kronenberg says very truly that Lotze's philosophy is anthropocentric in its standpoint.¹ It is characteristic of Lotze's attitude that he approaches the philosophical problem in the interests of man, not confident of a full solution, but hopeful of gaining an insight that shall answer the more urgent questions as to the meaning of man's life. The more deeply the features of the great world-picture impress themselves upon consciousness, the "more vividly will they point us back to ourselves, and stir up anew the question—What significance have man and human life with its constant phenomena, and the changing course of history, in the great whole of Nature."² The very title of the *Mikrokosmos*, and its modest sub-title, *An attempt at an Anthropology*, indicate the importance of the place held by man in Lotze's conception of the total system of things. This work, which is the most comprehensive statement of his philosophy, has for its express aim the task of ascertaining the nature of man and his relation to the cosmos.

The problem of man's being is, in its widest aspect, the problem we have already discussed as regards the universe as a whole, namely, that of the mechanical *versus* the ideal view. Is man a mechanism, differing from other mechanisms only in degree of complexity? Are his physical and mental life, his ethical and

¹ Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 23-25.

² *Mikr.*, XV-XVI.

social activities, wholly explicable by mechanical laws? Or must we, in order adequately to explain these complex and varied phenomena, have recourse to a principle quite other than mechanical? This is the real problem of the *Mikrokosmos*, and the answer to it will be found to involve Lotze's answer to every question concerning the nature of man and the meaning of human life. We are prepared to find a generous admission of the mechanical point of view as affording a partial explanation of the phenomena in question, but a firm denial that the mechanical explanation is ultimate.

From the beginning of his scientific labors to the close of his philosophical career, Lotze insisted upon the prevalence of mechanism in the body. Even in the works which preceded the *Medicinische Psychologie*, this view is set forth and defended with clearness and vigor.¹ Later, in connection with his philosophical theory, he but recapitulates—to use his own term—the conclusions thus early developed, for the purpose of calling attention to the fact that a complete view must show how the mechanical conception of vital phenomena harmonizes with the requirements of the ideal view which philosophy never ceases to urge.²

In some form or other there has always existed a reluctance to admit that the origin of life and the processes of life are to be accounted for by ordinary mechanical laws. This reluctance has been based not alone upon ethical and religious grounds, but upon theoretical considerations as well, and has afforded inducement to postulate a 'vital principle' of some sort, dependent in a general sense upon material conditions, but superior to the physical and chemical laws which dominate matters.³ While sympathizing in some measure with the motives which lead to this view, Lotze unhesitatingly denies the conclusion. The assumption of a superior principle in organic bodies which presides over and effects vital phenomena, is both unnecessary and inadequate for the explanation of such phenomena. It is unnecessary; for our analysis never reaches the point where we can pronounce with

¹ See *Lebenskraft*, 1843, and *Seele und Seelenleben*, 1846, both published in Rudolph Wagner's *Handwörterbuch der Physiologie*. Also *Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens*, 1851.

² *Met.*, § 224.

³ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 224–225.

assurance that the limit of mechanical efficiency is found, and that now a new principle must be summoned to our aid. Mechanism in the widest sense of the term includes every case in which effects are produced by the reciprocal action of different elements of whatever kind, working in accordance with universal laws.¹ When used in this sense, it becomes evident that there is nowhere any exception to the dependence of life on mechanical causes.² Everywhere we find the interaction of parts in accordance with fixed law. Moreover, the assumption of another and higher principle is inadequate for the explanation of vital phenomena, and raises insuperable difficulties. It must needs be quite impotent unless it works by means of just such a system of laws as it is meant to supersede. "It is not obvious where such a force could be inherent, unless in the sum of living parts and their systematic combinations; it is not obvious how it should come to alter its mode of operation and at each moment effect what is necessary, so long as we do not suppose that by regular necessity it becomes different, and works differently under altered circumstances, like every force which is the result of a variety of changeable parts."³

In short, Lotze concludes, a mechanical method is absolutely necessary in order to explain the connection of vital phenomena. Life is derived "not from some peculiar principle of action, but from a peculiar mode of utilizing the principles which govern the whole physical world."⁴ To maintain this, however, is not to deny that the forms of organic life exhibit purpose, nor is it to degrade them to the level of mere machines.⁵ The first book of the *Mikrokosmos* aims to show that we do not need to assume a special life-principle, but that the structure of the body, the structure and functions of the various organs, and the conservation of life are to be explained by reference to mechanical causes.⁵

¹ *Met.*, § 227.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I: p. 80; *Met.*, § 233.

³ *Mikr.*, I: p. 84; Cf. *Met.*, § 227.

⁴ *Met.*, § 229.

⁵ On the differences between the living body and the machine compare *Mikr.*, I: pp. 80-83; *Met.*, § 228.

⁵ Cf. Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 25-26; Pfeleiderer: *Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung*, pp. 14-17.

The steady advance of scientific research would seem to warrant Lotze's conclusion that, however far our analysis may be pushed, we should still find that the ends of life are served by the application of nature's general means with which we are already familiar.¹ In the movable framework of the body, as well as in the action of the muscles, we find exhibited in the utmost variety and delicacy those devices to promote movement which are commonly termed mechanical ; while the functioning of the internal organs, the constant renewal and progressive development of the body, involve an extensive application of chemical laws already known to us by the study of inorganic matter.

In fine, man's body is a mechanism ; it obeys certain definite physical and chemical laws, by reference to which its structure and functions are, from a scientific point of view, wholly explicable. Neither here nor elsewhere, however, is the scientific view final. The mechanical conception, so far from excluding the teleological, implies teleology as the real ground of mechanism.² We are never justified in speaking of the body as a mere mechanism. As we have already seen, a mere mechanism exists nowhere in nature. Everything is what it is and acts as it does by virtue of the living potency of the Absolute present in it, and active through the instrumentality of mechanical laws. The flying projectile is obedient to this inner force, and the living body owes its vitality to the same principle. The Absolute works differently in different forms of being, but it is the one active Being from which all finite things receive, in varying degrees, a derivative and limited power of action.

If the objection be made that after all Lotze has only substituted a superior kind of vitalism for what is ordinarily meant by that term, it may be said in reply that his theory avoids the two great errors of vitalism as the term is commonly understood ; namely, that a wholly new principle must be assumed in order to explain the phenomena of life, and, secondly, that the action of this principle supersedes and transcends the physical laws which operate universally in the inorganic world.

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 86-87.

² Cf. von Hartmann : *Lotze's Philosophie*, pp. 42.

Turning now to the consideration of man's mental life, we find that the conception of the soul has existed long, and is deeply rooted in the convictions of men. The languages of all civilized peoples have some word to denote this somewhat vague notion of a subject of our sensations and emotions, conditioned and limited by the body, yet in truth sovereign over it and surviving its dissolution. Belief in the existence of the soul has been supported, Lotze finds, by three lines of argument based upon an assumed freedom of self-determination, the incomparability of physical and psychical processes, and the unity of consciousness. Lotze is undoubtedly right in pronouncing the first two of these inconclusive¹; attention, therefore, will here be confined to the third.

The one conclusive argument for the existence of the soul is to be found in the fact of the unity of consciousness.² By this term it is not meant to assert that for each living form there exists but one soul, a conclusion, indeed, that would seem to be discredited by certain experiments upon low forms of life. Nor is it meant that we have a persistent consciousness of the unity of our being; self-observation does not confirm this proposition. It is not even meant to affirm that the soul must be a unity because it appears to itself as such. The force of the argument lies in the fact that in consciousness we have the unity of a being conscious of itself. That the manifold variety of mental experience, present and past, can be so brought together as to be presented as the experience of the self, a matter of self-observation, is the most positive and convincing proof of the unity of that being which accomplishes this. If the soul "even but rarely, but to a limited extent, nay even but once," were capable of this feat, the case would be proved. Not that we believe in the unity of the soul because it appears to itself a unity, but simply because it is able to appear to itself at all, because it is able to manifest itself in any way whatever. "The mere fact that, conceiving itself as a subject, it connects itself with any predicate, proves to us the unity of that which asserts this connection. Every judgment, whatever it may assert, testifies, by the mere fact that it is pro-

¹ For his discussion of these arguments see *Mikr.*, I: pp. 161-169; *Met.*, §§238-240.

² Cf. Krestoff: *Lotze's metaphysischer Seelenbegriff*, pp. 14-26.

nounced at all, to the indivisible unity of the subject which utters it." ¹ This whole argument is very characteristic of Lotze, both by reason of the clear and forcible manner in which he leads to the conclusion, and by reason also of the facility with which this conclusion when reached finds its place in his system, and enters into happy relations with the doctrines he chiefly insists upon.

The result reached thus far may very well be expressed in the traditional form of a belief in a supersensuous soul, mysteriously connected with the body, but not of it, an indivisible and simple substance. But in seeking further to determine the nature of the soul, we must take into account the meaning which Lotze attaches to substance. Negatively, it is not any substratum of reality, either a physical or a spiritual entity. "My only definition of the idea of substance," says Lotze, "was this,—that it signifies everything which possesses the power of producing and experiencing effects, in so far as it possesses that power. Accordingly, this expression was simply a title given to a thing in virtue of its having performed something; it was not and could not be meant to signify the ground, the means, or the cause which would render that performance intelligible." ² Mental activities, then, and the unifying of these in consciousness, afford the best possible example of what Lotze means by substance. ³ As we have seen, it is this experience of the unity of consciousness, he believes, which warrants us in regarding the 'thing' as in any sense a substantial unity, and compels us to attribute to it a spiritual existence. It is only an indivisible unity which can produce or experience effects.

Hence to the question, 'What then *is* the soul?' our answer must be to unfold the nature of its activities. The activity of anything is the truest possible expression of its nature. The living reality of the soul is to be sought in its concrete forms of actions, its ideas, emotions, and efforts, not in some noumenal 'substrate.' It need not trouble us that we can not tell what the soul is in itself, apart from its activities. All our definitions

¹ *Met.*, § 244; cf. *Mikr.*, I: pp. 170-176.

² *Met.*, § 243.

³ On Lotze's concept of substance, compare Krestoff: *Lotze's metaphysischer Seelenbegriff*, pp. 26-34.

are hypothetical ; they never state what a thing is, but how it acts under certain conditions. That which does not act and react has no existence, since the very essence of being is activity. Neither should we raise the question how the soul came to be. This knowledge, Lotze remarks, could be of moment to us only if it were to be applied to the creation of a world. Our task is simply to apprehend what is.

Preliminary to his discussion of the characteristic activities of the soul, Lotze asks whether there is a "single primitive mode of mental manifestation from which as from a common root the other faculties proceed." This question he answers in the negative, deciding in favor of the three primary and irreducible activities, cognition, feeling, and volition.¹ Two points here, or rather two aspects of what is essentially the same thing, are of importance. First, that these primitive powers are not to be regarded as a triumvirate of distinct and separable faculties, a tripartite division of the soul.² On the contrary, what we know as three is after all but one in the being of the soul. In every mode of its action the whole soul is present and energizes ; in ideation, for example, the whole soul expresses itself, but incompletely. So also in affection and in volition.³ The second point is that the soul belongs to the category of beings capable of excitation. Its activities are exercised, not spontaneously, but in reaction to stimulus.⁴ The stimuli may be external or internal, but the action of the soul is necessarily conditioned thus : the soul responds with its own native energy to a train of ideas as well as to an excitation through an organ of sense. It is a constant element in all the higher reactions. Not only in the simple forms of sensation, affection, and effort, but in all the highly complex and elaborated mental processes into which these enter as constituents, the soul is active after its own fashion. Nor is it in any way to disparage the soul or the character of its products to maintain that its activity must be called forth in response to stimulus. It is true of

¹ Cf. *Met.*, § 245 ; *Mikr.*, I : pp. 212—215.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 199—201.

³ *Mikr.*, I : pp. 202—203.

⁴ *Mikr.*, I : pp. 204—211.

the soul, as of every other element of reality, that its action depends to a greater extent upon its own nature than upon the nature of that which excites it to action.

Here it may be well to notice Lotze's solution of the long-vexed problem of the nature of the union of mind and body. Quite in harmony with his general metaphysical view, his conclusion is that this relation is one of interaction by means of a psycho-physical mechanism.¹ For Lotze the problem loses its crucial difficulty; since his metaphysics admits no division of reality into the two realms of mind and matter, there is no question as to the possibility of interaction between two disparate forms of being. All reality being spiritual, we have only the primary difficulty of the conception of reciprocal action between any two elements of reality. The solution of this general problem we have already discussed. The difficulty in the notion of the union of mind and body as commonly conceived has been created, Lotze believes, by positing two beings so wholly disparate as to be incapable of reciprocal action and then attempting to unite them by means of a merely external bond. Our premises here need modification. No external bond could suffice to explain the union we do actually find. Their reciprocal action is itself what holds them together²; the union of mind and body consists in the fact that they can and do interact. This interaction must have its ultimate ground in the essential nature of the elements themselves. It is a mistake to imagine that the interaction of mind and body presents a difficulty inherently greater than the interaction of so-called material elements.³ As we have seen, the reciprocal action of things is, in the final analysis, inexplicable. The relation of mind and body is but a special case under the general problem of the reciprocal relations of ultimate elements, and this general problem becomes intelligible only by means of the conception of the immanence of all finite things in the World-Ground.

¹ On the interaction of mind and body, see *Medizinische Psychologie*; cf. also *Met.*, §§ 247-249; *Mikr.*, I: pp. 306-323; *Outl. of Psy.*, §§ 66-68. See also Krestoff: *Lotze's metaphysischer Seelenbegriff*, pp. 67-78; Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, pp. 29, 34-35.

² *Mikr.*, I: p. 306.

³ *Met.*, § 248.

But even on the assumption of an incomparability of physical and psychical elements, it would still be an unfounded prejudice to suppose that only like can act on like.¹ One of the common arguments against the interaction of body and mind is that the physical law of the conservation of energy is incompatible with this conception.² Lotze's discussion of this point is luminous.³ Of the practical truth of this comprehensive physical principle he has no doubt; he urges caution, however, and avoidance of hasty generalizations and deductions from this principle. We need first of all to dismiss the notion of a nameless primitive force of no determinate character, consisting merely in a constant amount. Such an abstraction can have no meaning and no reality. "What really gives to each phenomenon its character is the concrete nature of that which embodies the quantum of force, either wholly or partly, for the time being."⁴ Of greater importance, however, in the interpretation of this principle is Lotze's distinction between *equality* and *equivalence* of force. In so far as we can reduce two physical processes *A* and *C* to comparable primary occurrences consisting in comparable velocities of comparable masses, in so far it may be shown that *C*, which is produced by *A*, contains precisely the same amount of energy which *A*, by producing it, has lost. Where the two elements do not admit of this exact comparison, it is an essentially arbitrary course to conclude that the two processes in question involve the same amount of energy differently distributed. In this latter case, all we can say is that the two are *equivalent*, not that they are *equal*.⁵ Hence, to argue that the interaction of mind and body is impossible, since there can be no equating of energy in antecedent and consequent, is to ignore the fact that we are now dealing with elements in relation to which the term energy, as measured by mass and velocity, has no meaning whatever. We have no unit of measure common to physical and psychical processes. There is an equivalence of activities, certainly; we may say that a specific amount of one, measured by the unit *m*, corresponds to a specific amount of the other, measured by the unit *m'*. We can-

¹ *Met.*, § 248.

⁴ *Met.*, § 213.

² Cf. Külpe: *Outl. of Psy.*, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

³ Cf. *Met.*, §§ 211-215.

not equate the two. Experience would seem to show, therefore, that the physical law of the conservation of energy is but a special case under the more comprehensive principle of the equivalence of different effects.¹ Lotze has here drawn a very true distinction, and his whole discussion throws light on a problem too much involved in obscurity and confusion.

In the foregoing consideration of the proof of the soul's existence and the nature of its activity, we have already received a partial answer to the question as to how far man is a mechanism. In order to a more complete answer to this question, however, let us consider the characteristic mental activities, and seek to determine in what measure these are explicable by the mechanical principle.

In general, it may be said that the train of our ideas, the current of thoughts, feelings, and volitions, well-nigh infinitely varied and complex, which make up our inner life, has its course and connections mechanically determined.² "The concordant result of self-observation has long and generally been the conception of a mechanism by which the course of internal phenomena is directed, perhaps universally, certainly to a great extent, having other forms indeed, and governed by laws of its own differing from those of external nature, but exhibiting a like thorough-going dependence of each several event on its preceding conditions."³ This psychical mechanism reveals itself in many ways, in the phenomena of memory and recollection, and in the dependence of our feelings and volitions on certain impressions by which they are regularly evoked. In daily life we reckon on its unfailing efficiency. Yet so much greater are the difficulties of internal observation than the observation of external nature that we are unable to state with precision the laws of this mechanism.⁴ Certain of the modes of connection, however, are so marked that they are designated as laws, for example, the so-called Laws of Association and Reproduction.⁵

But when we have described the train of ideas, or the 'stream of consciousness,' and have seen that it reveals the workings of a psy-

¹ *Met.*, § 214.

⁴ *Ibid.*

² *Mikr.*, II, 3; *Met.*, III, Ch. 2.

⁵ Cf. *Mikr.*, I: pp. 241-246.

³ *Mikr.*, I: p. 218.

chical mechanism, we have by no means exhausted the mind's wealth or explained its most characteristic activities. All knowledge involves the comprehending and the judging of the facts presented, the active relating of ideas. These higher mental energies differ from the mind's reaction to external stimulus. They are reactions, to be sure, but of such a character as to imply a peculiar spontaneity and creative energy on the part of the mind. So, at least, Lotze maintains. To these relating activities of mind we now direct attention.¹

Lotze's modification of the doctrine of 'innate ideas'² makes clear his view as to what is the essential character of the mind's relating activity. The old notion of 'innate ideas' as original possessions of the mind, pure concepts of the understanding, pre-formed and ready for use, Lotze rejects as utterly untenable. On the other hand, the empiricism which postulates a passive receptivity of mind falls into an error equally great. The so-called 'innate ideas'—judgments of space, time, cause, and the rest—are merely the mind's habitual reactions. There is that in the original constitution of mind which constrains it at the suggestion of experience to develop these modes of conception. "No more than the spark as spark is already present in the flint before the steel calls it forth, do these concepts hover complete before consciousness previously to all impressions of experience . . ."³ But, on the other hand, it is quite as inconceivable that they should be conveyed in experience: they exist only for the mind and by virtue of the mind's action. The relating activity of mind is manifest chiefly in two ways, in the apprehension of the world by the understanding, and in the unifying comprehension of Reason.⁴ Let us consider each of these briefly.

Thinking goes beyond the mechanism of perception and memory. It tests and corrects the mechanical connection of ideas; it is, however, by no means independent of mechanism, but on the

¹ See *Mikr.*, II, 4.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, I: pp. 254-256; 2: pp. 294-295; *Kl. Schr.*, 3: pp. 523-528. *Logik*, § 324.

³ *Mikr.*, I: p. 255.

⁴ *Mikr.*, I: pp. 257-268.

contrary it is aided and directed in the exercise of its function by that very mechanical connection of ideas. The train of ideas alone is not *thinking*, and by itself can not discharge the offices of thinking.¹ In the three distinct forms of thinking activity, the concept, the judgment, and the syllogism, thought shows on the one side a dependence upon the mechanical connection of ideas, and on the other a spontaneous and creative energy by virtue of which its product is peculiarly its own. The concept, for example, depends upon a series of perceptions and images; but it is more than the combination of particular images, it is a coherent whole, a true universal, and as such is not adequately accounted for by perception and memory. The judgment still further transcends the mere mechanical order. It actively affirms a connection beyond that of the mere combination of ideas.² The syllogism likewise shows in a more elaborated form that which characterizes all the activities of the understanding, namely, the presence of a universal under which the particulars of experience are brought.³

Besides sense and understanding, Lotze finds in the human mind "a still higher cognitive energy—the activity of Reason, that, aiming at unity in our conception of things, seeks to complete experience."⁴ We have previously noticed the distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.⁵ It is the office of the former to combine and relate under the categories of space and time, of substance and attribute, of antecedent and consequent. It does not ask how the various parts are to unite to form a whole, nor does it speculate as to the nature and meaning of that whole. The principles of the understanding, Lotze says, exhibit to us the style of the world's construction, but not the form of the outlines of its completed whole.⁶ The completing and unifying of our knowledge is the true function of Reason, though it is far from fully accomplishing its task. In this supreme activity the mind comes finally into its own. The mechanism of the psychical life is seen to occupy its properly subordinate place of means to an end.

¹ *Mikr.*, I : p. 261.

² *Mikr.*, I : p. 263.

³ *Mikr.*, I : p. 264-5.

⁴ *Mikr.*, I : p. 266.

⁵ See Ch. II.

⁶ *Mikr.*, I : p. 267.

In how far, it may now be asked, does the mechanical principle suffice for the explanation of man's mental life? We have, first of all, found the necessity of positing a soul—a self-conscious and unitary being which manifests itself in its various modes of activity—as the basis of mental life. Its activities are characteristic reactions which by reason of their uniformity and universality admit of being formulated by us as definite psychical laws. At least, some of them are thus formulated by us. These laws may be termed mechanical, in that consequent follows antecedent with invariable uniformity. The mechanical principle is adequate for the scientific explanation of psychical phenomena. The mechanical principle does not, however, give a full account of the being whose nature it is to act as it does. Here, as in the external world, we have an ultimate element of reality, the meaning of which we have not solved when we have determined merely the laws of its action. The reality is a concrete whole, the law is an abstract formula obtained by the analysis of its activity. Science discovers and formulates the laws which are the modes of procedure of things. There remain, after science has done its work, the further questions: What is the function of the thing as a whole, and what is its relation to other wholes? What is its significance in the system of reality? There is no conflict between mechanism and teleology. Each implies the other. Mechanism not only leaves room for teleology, but implies teleology as affording the final explanation which is beyond its own province. Teleology implies mechanism, or, at least, a system of means for the realization of its ends. The distinction here drawn is not without significance even in the realm of inanimate things. The engine is adequately explained for scientific purposes when the principles of its construction are understood, and the laws by which the latent energy of fuel becomes available for motive power. Its final explanation, however, is teleological, involving an account of its function in the social economy of the world.

A further question arises here. Do teleology and mechanism bear the same relation to each other in Lotze's conception of man as in his conception of the world? We have seen that he insists

upon the universal extent of mechanism throughout the realm of nature, organic and inorganic alike. No higher principle need be appealed to at any point in order to explain any physical process. Mechanism is absolutely universal in extent, but quite subordinate in significance. Its explanation is scientifically complete, but it is never ultimate. Does the mental life likewise testify to the universality of the mechanical principle, or are we forced to admit here the possibility of activities not in any sense mechanical?

On this point Lotze is by no means clear. Not infrequently we find him maintaining the universal prevalence of mechanism in the mental life.¹ The processes of thinking—the formation of the concept, the judgment, the syllogism—all involve a necessary dependence on mechanical law.² The ideal nature of mind is realized only through and by means of the psychical mechanism.³ Over against these affirmations, we find others of quite different import. Lotze seems quite unmistakably to say that as we pass beyond the simpler mental processes to those more complex processes which involve the relating activity of mind, the principle of mechanism is in some sense transcended, and gives place to a peculiarly spontaneous action not to be regarded as mechanical.⁴ There is still a partial dependence on the mechanical principle, to be sure, since these higher activities involve and comprehend the simpler ones. For example, the concept involves the memory-image, and hence the mechanism of association and reproduction. The essential feature in the concept, however, is the reference to a true universal, a coherent and indivisible whole which postulates an act of thought quite different from the mere holding together of a group of particulars.⁵ The thought-activity which produces the concept, Lotze seems to say, cannot, from any point of view, be termed mechanical. The same is true of all the higher activities involved in thought. As the mental life evolves from lower to higher forms, the presence of the uni-

¹ Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 218–219 ; 2 : pp. 241–246 ; *Met.*, § 247.

² *Mikr.*, I : pp. 262–265.

³ *Mikr.*, 2 : pp. 275–276.

⁴ Cf. *Mikr.*, I : pp. 250–253, 256.

⁵ *Mikr.*, I : p. 262.

versal becomes increasingly evident in the processes of thought. Indeed, the distinguishing mark of thought is just this presence of the universal. "It is distinctive of the mind of man to be able, by reflecting on the cognitive acts it has mechanically executed, to discern in these the presence of laws that reach out indefinitely beyond the particular cases in which internal experience finds them fulfilled."¹ The mere mechanical course of our ideas, Lotze here maintains, can never account for this attainment of the universal.

There is obviously some confusion in Lotze's thought as to the degree to which mechanism prevails in the mental life. There is apparently, also, a discrepancy between the limitation imposed upon the mechanical principle here, and the universality claimed for it in the physical world. Lotze does not seem to be conscious of any inconsistency, or of any need of reconciling the two conceptions. In the physical world, as we have seen, a thorough-going mechanism is yet not incompatible with teleology. May not this position be quite as tenable in the explanation of the mental life? Mechanism and teleology are either incompatible everywhere or nowhere. I believe that Lotze is right in maintaining that the two principles are not at variance, but, on the contrary, are reciprocally implied in reality. If this be the true conception it must hold good for all reality, for the spiritual reality which we know as the soul, as well as for that which we term matter. In both cases, on Lotze's principles, we are dealing with elements that are spiritual in their nature. In no case is the so-called law something imposed from without which the element is bound to obey. Nor can it be regarded as even an inner necessity. It is, rather, the characteristic manner in which the element responds to excitation. It is the spontaneous exercise of a primitive and inherent energy. There is place here for freedom, within a certain range, at least, and for a tendency to develop improving reactions and hence to make progress towards a goal. The lower an element is in the scale of being, the less richly is it endowed by nature, doubtless, and the more simple and uniform are its reactions. What we term mechanical

¹ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 300-301.

law merely designates such uniform actions as attract our notice by their constant recurrence. They are analyzed by thought out of the very warp and woof of rational experience. There would seem to be, however, no just ground for a distinction in kind between the simple, frequently recurring reactions which are manifest in 'things' and in the simpler mental operations, and those more complex and apparently more spontaneous reactions which we have designated as the relating activities of mind. The latter are more significant, doubtless, as indicating the nature and possibilities of man; strictly speaking, they are not more spontaneous, nor do they render any more imperative a teleological interpretation. Not that the lower activities are to be explained by the mechanical principle, and the higher by the teleological, but that lower and higher alike require both the teleological and mechanical principles for their complete explanation. Throughout the whole range of reality we must recognize 'the realism of the *form* of being, the idealism of its *content*.'¹

In close connection with the view of man's nature as teleological in significance but mechanical in the mode of its activities, is Lotze's conception of man as a personality. Indeed, the latter conception is in an important sense fundamental to and presupposed by the former. Not only is Lotze's philosophy anthropocentric, his chief contention is for the recognition of the whole nature of man.² Man is a being possessed not alone of understanding, but of feelings and will; his affections and aspirations, his ideals of worth, of duty, and of truth must be taken into account, for they form a part of the data of experience which no philosophy can overlook with impunity. It is just this ignoring of the living, concrete content of experience, which is 'richer than thought,' that constitutes the great defect of the Hegelian system, according to Lotze's thinking, and makes of the famous dialectic 'a ghostly ballet of bloodless categories.'

While Lotze spared no denunciations of what he regarded as

¹ Cf. Pfeleiderer: *Lotze's philosophische Weltanschauung*, pp. 63, 66; Vorbrodt: *Principien der Ethik und Religionsphilosophie Lotzes*, p. 37.

² Cf. Kronenberg: *Moderne Philosophen*, p. 24 seq.

an arrogant intellectualism, it is by no means just to assume that his attitude is accurately stated by classing him as one whose chief aim is to defend the rights of faith against the pretensions of knowledge, or to maintain the supremacy of the practical over the theoretical reason. Professor H. Jones says of Lotze that he regarded the antithesis between faith and knowledge as final, and tried to establish harmony by separating the antagonists, and dividing the realm of reality between them, making some things objects of belief, and others objects of knowledge.¹ The truth seems rather to be that Lotze recognized these two spheres, and recognizing also the fact that most men take part in both without being able to unite the two, sought earnestly to show their essential unity in a complete *Weltanschauung*.² The outcome of this attempt is his doctrine of the Good as the supreme principle which realizes itself in the world of finite reality by means of a system of eternal laws or truths. This attempt may or may not be deemed successful; the point to be noted here is that the fact that it was made at all argues against the view that Lotze held faith and knowledge to be fundamentally opposed and irreconcilable. At the end of a brief discussion of the familiar antithesis between faith and knowledge, Lotze remarks that "the only remnant of any useful result from this opposition of science to faith is, therefore, the conviction that the whole of our knowledge certainly does not originate from external experience, which is mediated for us by the senses; but that there are also inner states which are available as data for the acquisition of truth."³ Among these inner data are those of feeling, and Reason's judgments of worth as based upon such data are as valid as Reason's judgments of truth.

In connection with Lotze's general ethical conceptions we have already discussed at some length his doctrine of the feelings and their significance for mental life.⁴ It was there shown that the mind possesses by original endowment the power of reacting upon impressions with feelings of pleasure and pain, and that these feelings form the data of judgments of value, quite distinct from

¹ Jones: *Lotze's Doctrine of Thought*, pp. 24, 39.

² Cf. *Introd. to Mikr.*, X.

³ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 4; see also §§ 2-3.

⁴ Cf. Ch. II.

judgments of fact and of truth. It was further shown that self-consciousness grows out of this primitive self-feeling, and that all effort of will must be traced back to the same source. Self-consciousness is the *sine qua non* of personality, and hence personality is rooted in feeling. It is conceivable that a being might possess a superior intelligence, but lack all capacity for experiencing pleasure and pain; such a being could never know itself as an ego, the subject of its own states as over against the non-ego.¹ The function of feeling as the basis of the apprehension of value has also been discussed somewhat at length in a foregoing chapter. It is unnecessary to repeat here the argument developed there. Emphasis was laid upon the fact that feeling forms the basis of Reason's determinations of worth in theoretical, æsthetic, and ethical ideals. Thus the regulative Ideas, the norms of judgment and conduct, are what they are and influence life as they do by virtue of the presence and potency in them of feeling. Reason, man's crowning faculty, which impels him to unify and complete his fragmentary knowledge, is not coldly cognitive but 'worth-appreciative.' It is rooted in the cognitive reaction and the feeling reaction, two primal activities of the soul.

It would be easy to show that feeling also manifests a dependence on mechanism; for example, it is intimately connected with the subtle laws of association. It is evoked by stimulus, and in its simpler forms shows the mechanical uniformity noticeable in the simpler cognitive processes. As forming a constituent element in the more highly elaborated mental activities it shows the spontaneity which in general characterizes the higher phases of mental life. Feeling, no less than thought, tends to transcend the particular and attain to the universal. This it does in the Ideals of the worth-determining Reason.

Man's life, developing according to mechanical principles, leads out into the wide regions of ideal truth and conduct. Feeling and cognition alike begin with the particular, under the strict necessity of mechanical law, but lead to the universal, and show an increasingly evident subordination of mechanism to ideal ends. The conclusion of the fifth book of the *Mikro-*

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 37.

kosmos puts the matter as follows: "If we choose to sum up under the name of the Infinite that which stands opposed to particular finite manifestations, we may say that the capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite is the distinguishing endowment of the human mind, and we believe that we can at the same time pronounce that this capacity has not been produced in us by the influence of experience, but that having its origin in the very nature of our being, it only needed favoring conditions of experience for its development."¹

In man, as in the cosmos, mechanism exists in order to the realization of ideal ends. Man's nature prompts him 'to make very large claims on existence.' Truth and Worth are to be realized in and by him. The mechanism of the body and of mental action is but the means by which he comes into this more abundant life.² The emphasis is thus chiefly on personality. It is only in the measure that the human spirit partakes of the personality of the Infinite that it is truly real, and only in this measure can Good and good things have any meaning for it.³

Every specific problem bearing upon the life and destiny of man is referred by Lotze to this fundamental conception of man's nature. The problem of freedom presents especial difficulties for him because of his insistence on the universal applicability of the principle of mechanism.⁴ He does little more with it than sift the arguments on both sides, and finally pronounce freedom of action an indispensable attribute of spiritual life. Without freedom "the world would be, not indeed unthinkable and self-contradictory, but unmeaning and incredible."⁵ That human spirits are "secondary centers of intelligent activity not entirely determined in their effects by the mechanical system of things,"⁶ Lotze holds to be an indubitable truth. Though immanent in the Infinite, they are yet in a certain sense 'outside' Him, by virtue

¹ *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 341-342.

² Cf. *Mikr.*, 2: pp. 275-276.

³ Cf. *Mikr.*, 3: p. 623.

⁴ On freedom in relation to mechanism and teleology, see Wahn: *Kritik der Lehre Lotze's von der menschlichen Wahlfreiheit*, pp. 38-50, 57.

⁵ *Met.*, § 65.

⁶ *Met.*, § 230.

of their very selfhood. Thus they become self-acting centers, able in a restricted measure to initiate new processes which do not proceed from the Absolute.¹ Lotze defends with vigor the doctrine of freedom in the sense of an unconditioned and absolutely free choice; he frankly admits that freedom in this sense is incomprehensible, and directs the force of his logic chiefly to showing that the objections to this view are less insuperable than determinists have been wont to assume.²

Quite as disappointing is Lotze's dismissal of the problem of evil as theoretically insolvable. His keenly analytic mind was well aware of the difficulties in both these riddles. He has shown extraordinary acumen in discovering the weaknesses of the arguments by which men have ordinarily sought to minimize the glaring fact of the prevalence of evil, and to apologize for their conviction that, notwithstanding this, the ground and goal of the world is good. No one has dealt more ruthlessly with such arguments, nor faced the actual facts more unflinchingly.³ To assume that evil is necessary—that God, though having in view only the good, is bound to laws that do not permit the good—is to limit the omnipotence of the Supreme Being, to subject the Unconditioned to conditions. Such a view, so far from being any gain to speculation, would call a halt to all speculation until metaphysics could be established on a new foundation.⁴ The view that regards evil as an education, and hence a means to good, not only leads back to the difficulty just named, but fails to grasp the problem in its magnitude. It leaves out of account the amount of evil for which there is no compensation. It passes over, for instance, the natural and inexorable torture and destruction of life in the animal world, and the engulfing of countless hopelessly stunted human lives in misery and sin.⁵ A third view is that which regards moral evil as prior to and the cause of physical evil, and moral evil itself as necessarily involved in

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 56.

² Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 59-61; *Pract. Phil.*, §§ 17-23. See G. T. Ladd: "Lotze's Influence on Theology," *The New World*, No. 15.

³ See *Philos. of Relig.*, §§ 70-74.

⁴ Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, § 71.

⁵ Cf. *Philos. of Relig.*, § 72.

freedom. This statement of the case has more to commend it, yet it is likewise at fault. It is inexplicable why physical evil should follow moral evil as a natural consequence, or why the innocent should suffer with the guilty. But, moreover, "the assumption that nature was originally without evil, and that sin first brought it into the world, not only lacks all empirical foundation, but is even in itself considered untenable,"¹ since it implies that moral evil is a principle that can work in nature and to which nature yields a pliant obedience.

At the point where criticism should give place to construction, Lotze, with characteristic caution, withdraws from the field. For the problem of evil he has no solution to offer, save that which is implied in his entire system of philosophy. He does not hesitate, indeed, to maintain that the problem is theoretically insolvable. The existence of sin and evil in nature and in history is 'a decisive and altogether insurmountable difficulty' in the way of establishing the indubitable supremacy of the good.² For the solution of the enigma would require a perfect knowledge of the ultimate plan of the world,³ and such a knowledge man can never hope to attain. It is because he deems it useless and worse than useless to attempt any theoretical solution of the difficulty that Lotze attacks the time-worn arguments. "There ought not to remain any seeming as if there were . . . any real speculative proof for the correctness of the religious feeling upon which rests our faith in a good and holy God and in the destination of the world to the attainment of a blessed end."⁴

Left thus, the discussion is far from satisfactory, and deserves, perhaps, the severity of von Hartmann's criticism.⁵ But it is not fair to Lotze to leave it thus badly stated. Detached from the body of his doctrine, this discussion does indeed leave the antithesis between faith and knowledge complete and final. Interpreted in the light of his entire philosophy, however, the antithesis in large measure disappears. The Reason, in the full scope of its functions as worth-appreciative, approves and confirms much that by the exer-

¹ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 73.

² *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 610.

³ *Cf. Met.*, § 233.

⁴ *Philos. of Relig.*, § 74.

⁵ *Lotze's Philosophie*, pp. 22-23.

cise of its purely speculative activity it is unable to demonstrate. Its judgments are not therefore irrational. They are based upon empirically given data no less than are rational judgments of a speculative character.¹ Ultimately all knowledge appeals for the guarantee and criterion of its validity to the worth-appreciative Reason.² The antithesis is not between reason and feeling, not even, in truth, between knowledge and faith ; but, rather between the speculative and the worth-appreciative Reason, that is, between Reason in its narrower sense, limited to the judgment of fact and of truth, and Reason in its broader signification, extending its sovereignty over the whole realm of experience, judging not only of truth but of value. We find Lotze constantly reverting to and insisting upon this distinction. His great predecessors, Schelling and Hegel, he believes to have erred in large measure from an over-estimate of mere intelligence in comparison with the *whole* spiritual life. In his own view "all intelligence is only the *conditio sine qua non*, under which alone the final purposes that are really supreme—personal love and hate, the moral culture of character—and, in general, the whole content of life so far as it has value appears possible at all."³

The question of the final destiny of the human spirit is dealt with in much the same way as the problem of evil. It is customary to speak of Lotze's view as that of a conditional immortality. This term is somewhat misleading, however. He undoubtedly maintains that the sole ground for belief in the continued existence of the spirit is in the intrinsic worth of the human personality. In this sense, then, immortality is conditional : If the human spirit possesses such intrinsic worth that its destruction would impeach the meaning of the system of things, then its destruction is in the highest degree improbable. It is a question of values within the realm of Value. It can not be decided as a matter of fact, nor as a truth discerned by the intelligence. This view, however, contains no suggestion of a limitation of immortality to those of the human race who attain a

¹ Cf. Ch. II.

² *Met.*, § 94 ; *Logik.*, §§ 301, 303, 349 ; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 2 ; *Kl. Schr.*, 3 : pp. 529, 540-541.

³ *Encycl. of Philos.*, § 18.

certain, though unknown, standard of excellence. So far as the writer is aware, no such idea was ever seriously considered by Lotze, and it is certainly opposed to the trend of his thought. So to limit immortality would be to make quantitative differences of paramount importance, as well as wholly to ignore differences of environment, and make the destiny of the individual hang upon the incidents of race, time, and birth.

As in his discussion of the problem of evil, here also we find Lotze maintaining that the truth of immortality can not be established by reasoning. In the *Metaphysik* he points out the weakness of the logical argument that the soul is an eternal and immutable element, and hence must continue to exist. This conception, he says, forces upon us the equally valid conclusion of the soul's pre-existence, and is incompatible with the monistic view.¹ Without pausing to establish this point, he puts aside the problem as one that does not belong to metaphysics: "We have no other principle for deciding it beyond this general idealistic conviction that every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further application in human hands hardly needs to be mentioned. We certainly do not know the merits which may give to one existence a claim to eternity, nor the defects which deny it to others."² In the *Mikrokosmos* the course of the argument is much the same, and the same conclusions are reached.³

The problem of immortality, then, must take its place with those of freedom and of evil as presenting difficulties impossible of solution from a theoretical point of view. All these problems, however, demand of the Reason a belief in a solution which is beyond the reach of our knowledge. Such an ultimate solution would harmonize theoretical and practical demands, and show the validity of both. The import of Lotze's entire philosophy leaves no doubt as to his own conviction that the human personality

¹ *Met.*, § 245.

² *Met.*, § 245; cf. *Encycl. of Philos.*, § 10; *Philos. of Relig.*, § 91.

³ *Mikr.*, I: pp. 437-440.

possesses a worth that is the guarantee of its continued existence. This comes out clearly in the *Mikrokosmos*, in the chapter on "The Meaning of History."¹ Lotze's contention throughout this chapter is in behalf of the individual. That view which regards history as the education of humanity he rejects on the ground that the individual is lost sight of and sacrificed in the advance of the race. Humanity does not consist in a concept, but in living, personal beings, and "the reason of the world would be turned to unreason if we did not reject the thought that the work of vanishing generations should go on forever, only benefiting those who come later, and being irreparably wasted for the workers themselves. . . . We are impelled to a demand for the lasting preservation of that, the continual destruction of which would render fruitless all effort to develop even the universal itself."² It is Lotze's conviction that those who "have passed away from the sphere of earthly reality have not passed away from reality altogether, and that in some mysterious way the progress of history affects them too."³ For "no education of mankind is conceivable unless its final results are to be participated in by those whom this earthly course left in various stages of backwardness."⁴ Such a faith, Lotze grants, is less easy now than it was when the world was smaller and life simpler; yet to this primitive faith he holds fast, as he who seeks a plan in history will find himself inevitably compelled to do.⁵

Lotze's doctrine of man rests upon the same ethical concepts to which we have traced his doctrine of the world and of God, namely, the concepts of personality and of teleology. Each of these is found to imply unity. As we have seen, these concepts depend upon and grow out of the ultimate category of the Good. This fundamental aspect of Lotze's philosophy has been too little emphasized in the past. His critics have for the most part concerned themselves with details of his system, and have overlooked the importance of his synthesis of the Good, Reality, and Truth into an organic whole. Yet the fundamental unity of these con-

¹ *Mikr.*, 2, Ch. VII.⁴ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 53.² *Mikr.*, 3 : pp. 50-51.⁵ *Ibid.*³ *Mikr.*, 3 : p. 51.

ceptions is at once the starting-point and the goal of his thought, and it is this alone which makes his philosophy in any true sense a system. Not that the world first is, and then is seen to be good; the Good is not something evolved out of or added to Reality, it is the ground of all Reality, the Supreme Principle which manifests and realizes itself in the world. It is the material postulate of all being. Reality is the concrete embodiment of the Good; the system of mechanical laws is but the mode of its activity. The concept of the Good plays much the same part in Lotze's philosophy as it does in that of Plato. It may be symbolized, though inadequately, by the sun as the center of the solar universe; it is the center of all being and of all active energy, it dominates the course of every finite thing and of the entire system of things. We have sought to show how all Lotze's characteristic metaphysical doctrines grow out of this conception. The Good, further defined as Personality, prescribes every tenet of his doctrine of the world, of man, and of God. Thus in his own system is embodied Lotze's conviction that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics.





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